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Proxy caching is a key technique to reduce transmission cost for on-demand 
multimedia streaming. The effectiveness of current caching schemes, how-
ever, is limited by the insufficient storage space and weak cooperations 
among proxies and their clients, particularly considering the high bandwidth 
demands from media objects. 
In this thesis, we propose COPACC, a cooperative proxy-and-client 
caching system that addresses the above deficiencies. This innovative ap-
proach combines the advantages of both proxy caching and peer-to-peer 
client communications. It leverages the client-side caching to amplify the 
aggregated cache space and rely on dedicated proxies to effectively coordi-
nate the communications. We propose a comprehensive suite of distributed 
protocols to facilitate the interactions among different network entities in 
COPACC. It also realizes a smart and cost-effective cache indexing, search-
ing, and verifying scheme. Furthermore, we develop an efficient cache al-
location algorithm for distributing video segments among the proxies and 
clients. The algorithm not only minimizes the aggregated transmission cost 
of the whole system, but also accommodates heterogeneous computation 
and storage constraints of proxies and clients. 
We also address the incentive issue of COPACC. That is, what motivates 
each proxy to provide cache space to the system. To encourage proxies to 
participate, we suggest a revenue-rewarding scheme to credit the cooperative 
proxies according to the resources they contribute. Game-theoretic model is 
i 
used to analyze the interactions among proxies under the revenue-rewarding 
scheme. Since no system-wide property is achieved in the non-cooperative 
environment, we suggest two cooperative game settings that lead to socially 
optimal situations, where the benefits of the network entities are maximized. 
We have extensively evaluated the performance of the cooperative and 
incentive-based proxy-and-client caching system under various network and 
end-system configurations. The results demonstrate that it achieves remark-
ably lower transmission cost as compared to pure proxy-based caching with 
limited storage space. On the other hand, it is much more robust than a 
pure peer-to-peer communication system in the presence of node failures. 
Meanwhile, its computation and control overheads are both kept in low lev-
els. Furthermore, with the incentive mechanism incorporated, the proxies 
have a strong incentive to collaborate in COPACC, and the optimal net 




代理緩存（Proxy C a c h i n g )技術是降低隨選流式媒體傳输的一種關 
鍵技術。但是，現今的緩存技術在應用於頻寬要求較高的流式媒 
體時，會遇到存儲空間不足和代理間缺乏合作的問題。 
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Today's Internet has been increasingly used for carrying multimedia traf-
fic, and on-demand streaming for clients of asynchronous playback requests 
is amongst the most popular networked media services. Given its broad 
spectrum of applications, like NetTV and distance learning, it has attracted 
much attention with many practical deployments in recent years [50]. The 
limited server capacity and the unpredictable Internet environment, how-
ever, make efficient and scalable on-demand media streaming remain a chal-
lenging task. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Media Streaming 
To reduce server/network loads, an effective means is to cache frequently-
used data at proxies close to clients [35, 47]. Streaming media, particu-
larly those with asynchronous demands, could also benefit with a significant 
performance improvement from proxy caching given their static nature in 
content and highly localized access interests. However, media objects have 
high data rates and long playback durations, which combined yield a huge 
data volume. For illustration, a one-hour standard MPEG-1 video has a vol-
1 
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lime of about 675 MB; several such large streams will quickly exhaust the 
cache space of a standalone proxy. As such, it is necessary to design partial 
caching algorithms or group proxies to enlarge cache space [35, 12, 42, 51]. 
There have been extensive studies toward these directions, but the storage 
space of existing proxies are still far from satisfactory for media objects, and 
thus remains a bottleneck of the whole system. 
Another approach is to generalize the proxy functionalities into every 
client [14，26]. Such a peer-to-peer communication paradigm allows econom-
ical clients to contribute their local storage spaces for streaming. Specifically, 
the video data originally provided by a server are spread among clients of 
asynchronous demands, and each client can store the full or partial versions 
of the video stream in its local cache. Then, one or more clients can col-
lectively supply cached data to other clients, thus amplifying the system 
capacity with increasing suppliers over time. However, in contrast to the 
reliable and dedicated servers or proxies, the loosely-coupled autonomous 
end-hosts can easily crash or leave without notice. Given that a media play-
back lasts a long time and consumes huge resources, a pure peer-to-peer 
system can be highly vulnerable in the Internet environment. As there are 
no authoritative parties, it is also difficult to identify and penalize malicious 
clients that intentionally inject forged data. 
A hybrid caching system that combines the advantages of both proxy 
caching and peer-to-peer client communication can be used to address the 
above deficiencies. With the cooperation between the proxies and the clients 
in the network, the total network traffic of the media streaming can be 
significantly reduced. 
1.1.2 Incentive Mechanism 
The cooperative networks, especially P2P networks, have caught much at-
tention in recent years. In such systems, network entities collaborate with 
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each others by sharing their own resource, such as storage, bandwidth or 
computational power, to form a resource pool, and this aggregated resource 
pool helps to improve the system performance. Many real applications have 
been deployed, such as distributed file sharing [32] [7], collaborative web 
caching [49], P2P streaming [54], distributed computing [1], etc. It is gener-
ally agreed that the cooperative network performs significantly better than 
the traditional server-client model in supporting large amount of users. In 
short, it provides an inexpensive platform for application that requires scal-
ability, efficiency and robustness. 
However, most cooperative systems assume that the peers (or network 
entities) are "voluntary" to contribute. In fact, this assumption is not re-
alistic. The autonomous peers are selfish in nature, and without concrete 
incentive, there is no motivation to contribute resources, by which they in-
cur service degradation or suffer from cost. A study in Gnutella file sharing 
system [3] suggested that over 70% of users share little or no content. The 
large-scale deployment of the cooperative systems are obstructed by the 
free-riding problem, and motivating the peers to cooperate is critical to the 
success of such systems. 
To increase the involvement of network entities, participation incentive 
mechanisms [36] have to be used to effectively encourage them to collabo-
rate in the network [41]. Different approaches have been proposed in the 
literature. Better quality of service is given to the peers who contribute to 
the network, while free-riders are discriminated against. However, effective 
resource allocation that differentiates the contributors in a highly dynamic 
network is complicated. Others suggested using the reputation based sys-
tem, where reputations of the participating peers are accumulated so as to 
reflect their contribution. The major issue here is how to quantify the user's 
contribution. Also, a secure and trusted reputation system is essential to 
prevent fake reputation, but it is difficult to achieve without a centralized 
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authority. Nevertheless, whitewashing is possible for the malicious user by 
pretending to be another user. 
Another approach is to setup a contribution-rewarding mechanism to 
credit the peers cooperating in the system. The reward may come from 
the overall revenue of the cooperative network, by means of service pricing 
or cost reduction. The simplest way to achieve this goal is to grant a fixed 
credit to a peer whenever it participates. Such a scheme can be implemented 
easily, but it is unfair to the peer who contribute more resource. We can 
also reward the peers in proportional to the resources they contributed. This 
scheme not only achieves proportional fairness, but also encourages peers to 
supply sufficient amount of resource. By rewarding appropriately, sufficient 
amount of resources are supplied by the peers, and the efficiency of the 
overall system is improved. 
1.2 Cooperative and Incentive-based Proxy-and-
Client Caching 
In this thesis, we propose a cooperative and incentive-based proxy-and-client 
caching system for on-demand media streaming. The system consists of 
two components: Cooperative Proxy-and-Client Caching (COPACC) and 
Revenue-Rewarding Mechanism. 
1.2.1 Cooperative Proxy-and-Client Caching 
We propose a novel cooperative proxy-and-client caching system called CO-
PACC. The innovative approach in COPACC combines the advantages of 
both proxy caching and peer-to-peer client communications. We leverage the 
client-side caching to amplify the aggregated cache space and rely on dedi-
cated proxies to effectively coordinate the communications. We develop an 
efficient cache allocation algorithm that distributes video segments among 
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the proxies and clients. The algorithm not only minimizes the aggregated 
transmission cost of the whole system, but also accommodates heteroge-
neous computation and storage constraints of proxies and clients. COPACC 
also makes effective use of multicast delivery in local regions, which further 
reduces the cost of the system. 
COPACC also incorporates with a comprehensive suite of distributed 
protocols to facilitate the interactions among different network entities. 
Most operations in this protocol suite are executed by dedicated proxies. 
As such, it is not only suitable for clients with limited computation power, 
but also resilient to client failures. We also embed an efficient indexing and 
searching algorithm for video contents cached across different proxies or 
clients, as well as a signature verification mechanism, which can effectively 
identify and block malicious clients. 
The performance of COPACC is extensively evaluated under various 
network and end-system configurations. The results demonstrate that it 
achieves remarkably lower transmission cost as compared to proxy-based 
caching with limited storage space. On the other hand, with the assistance 
from dedicated proxies, it is much more robust than a pure peer-to-peer 
system. Its transmission cost only slightly increases when a large portion of 
clients fail, even though the clients contribute a significant fraction in the 
total cache space. Moreover, it scales well to larger networks, and the cost 
generally reduces when more proxies and clients cooperate with each other, 
1.2.2 Revenue-Rewarding Mechanism 
We also propose a revenue-rewarding scheme to address the incentive is-
sue. This incentive mechanism works complementary with COPACC in 
stimulating participation from the proxies. In fact, a cost-profit analysis 
has suggested that it is profitable to setup an incentive-based cooperative 
system for media streaming [39]. 
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Our scheme follows the contribution reward-based incentive approach to 
reward the proxies by part of the transmission cost saved from COPACC. We 
focus on how proxies' contributions are influenced by the revenue-rewarding 
scheme. Game theoretic model is used to analyze the interaction between 
proxies under different resource allocation games. We show that in the non-
cooperative environment, the proxies selfishly optimize its own utility. As 
a result, the best total benefit received by the network nodes are not guar-
anteed. We further propose two cooperative resource allocation games that 
lead to two different optimal situations. Both centralized and distributed 
algorithms are presented for the games to achieve different optimal situation. 
We examine the performance of the scheme in terms of profit maxi-
mization and utility maximization. By evaluating the net profit and the 
social welfare received by the network entities, we demonstrate that the 
proposed game settings motivate different entities in the network to cooper-
ate. In addition, two system-wide objectives: net profit and social welfare, 
are achieved. Also, the resulted resource allocation is cost-effective as only 
the proxies with low cost participate in the system. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
The major contributions of the thesis are in two folds. First, we propose 
COPACC, a cooperative proxy-and-client caching system, to minimize the 
network transmission cost for media streaming. Second, we address the in-
centive issue of the COPACC by suggesting a revenue-rewarding mechanism. 
The contributions are summarized as follows: 
Cooperative Proxy-and-Client Caching System: 
• An efficient yet optimal cache allocation algorithm is proposed to dis-
tribute video segments among proxies and clients such that the aggre-
gated network transmission cost is minimized. 
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• A comprehensive suite of distributed protocols are presented to facil-
itate the interactions among different entities in the cooperative net-
work. 
Revenue-Rewarding Mechanism: 
• A revenue-rewarding scheme is proposed to address the incentive issue 
in COPACC. It provides a strong incentive for the network entities to 
contribute in the system. 
• Game theoretic model is used to analyze the interactions among prox-
ies under the revenue-rewarding scheme. It shows that no system-wide 
property is achieved in non-cooperative game. 
• Two cooperative games are proposed to achieve different system-wide 
objectives. It shows that net profit and social welfare are maximized, 
and a cost-effective resource allocation is achieved in the cooperative 
games. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 1 is an introduction of this thesis. It gives an overview of the 
background of this work. It also briefly describes the proposed cooper-
ative and incentive-based proxy-and-client caching system. Moreover, 
it outlines the contribution and the organization of this thesis. 
• Chapter 2 gives a literature review about Media streaming, Incentive 
mechanism and Resource pricing. 
• Chapter 3 presents an overview of the COPACC architecture. It de-
rives an efficient algorithm for cache allocation, and describes the co-
operative caching protocol. It also evaluates COPACC with different 
performance metrics. 
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• Chapter 4 presents an incentive mechanism for COPACC. It gives an 
overview of the system, and presents the mathematical formulation. It 
describes the revenue-rewarding scheme applied in the three resource 
allocation games: Non-cooperative game, Profit maximizing game and 
Utility maximizing game. The performance of these games are also 
evaluated. 
• Finally, chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Related Work 
In this chapter, we review the works that are related to our proposed coop-
erative and incentive-based proxy-and-client caching system. Three kinds 
of work are presented here: Media streaming, Incentive mechanism and Re-
source pricing. 
2.1 Media Streaming 
Proxy Caching for Media Streaming 
Proxy caching for media streaming has attracted much attention in the past 
decade, and numerous algorithms have been proposed in the literature, e.g., 
run-length caching [13], prefix caching [42], and segment caching [12, 51, 38]; 
see a comprehensive survey in [35]. Considering the static nature of video 
contents and their intensive I/O demands, many of the algorithms employ a 
semi-static caching approach, where popular video portions are cached over 
a relatively long time period, rather than dynamically saved or replaced 
in response to individual client requests. COPACC also advocates semi-
static caching, and its cache allocation is closely related to the prefix-suffix 
partition and stream segmentation algorithms [46]. However, these studies 
generally focus on a single proxy case with no cooperation among proxies. 
9 
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 10 
It is well-recognized that proxies grouped together can achieve better 
performance than independent standalone proxies [16，28]. An example 
for media caching is MiddleMan [2], which operates a collection of proxies 
as a scalable cache cluster; media objects are segmented into equal-sized 
segments and stored across multiple proxies, where they can be replaced at 
a granularity of a segment. There are also several local proxies responsible 
to answer client requests by locating and relaying the segments. To achieve 
better load balance and fault tolerance, a Silo data layout is suggested in [10], 
which partitions a media object into segments of increasing sizes, stores more 
copies for popular segments, and yet guarantees at least one copy stored for 
each segment. Our work is motivated by these cooperative systems, and we 
enhance them by combining proxy caching and client-side caching, which 
greatly expands the aggregated cache storage with contributions from the 
less expensive clients. 
P2P Media Streaming 
Peer-to-peer communications have recently become a popular alternative to 
the traditional server-client paradigm. There are a series of pioneer works 
on peer-to-peer streaming, e.g., PROMISE [26], ZIGZAG [45], and CoopNet 
40], which have demonstrated the superior scalability of shifting all func-
tionalities to end-hosts. Yet, we are aware that, in contrast to the reliable 
and dedicated servers or proxies, the loosely-coupled autonomous end-hosts 
can easily crash, leave without notice, or even refuse to share its own data. 
Given that a media playback lasts a long time and consumes huge resources, 
we believe that dedicated proxies could still play an important role in build-
ing high-quality media streaming systems, as suggested in [11，55]. Different 
from COPACC which focuses on caching, the key issue addressed in these 
studies is the optimal construction of an overlay structure. For storage allo-
cation and management in a hybrid system, an optimal replication algorithm 
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is proposed in [27], and a cooperative algorithm between a single proxy and 
its clients in a local area network is presented in [20]. COPACC comple-
ments them by considering a more general system with multiple cooperative 
proxies with client caching. A two-level hybrid architecture is exploited in 
34], where an overlay network is used in the upper level to deliver videos 
from a central server to proxies and a collaborative-client network using 
loopback mechanism is applied in the lower level to transmit video data 
from proxy to clients. In loopback, cache is dynamically updated, which 
introduces an intensive disk I/O demand for the clients. Given that the 
video access pattern changes slowly, semi-static caching is adequate and it 
can be practically implemented. Moreover, Loopback concentrates on the 
collaboration between proxy and its clients only, but we also emphasize the 
importance of cooperative caching between proxies in reducing cost. 
2.2 Incentive Mechanism 
Recently a lot of efforts have been made to address the problems of free-
riding and tragedy of the commons [24] in the cooperative network. Various 
incentive mechanisms have been proposed to encourage the selfish nodes to 
cooperate by sharing their own resources with the community. 
Differential Service-based Incentive 
Differential service-based incentive has been well studied in the literature. 
Under such scheme, the peers that contribute more resource receive better 
quality of service, while the selfish peers contributing less are discriminated. 
A game theoretic framework has been suggested in [8] to improve the sys-
tem's performance by eliminating non-cooperative users. In this model, the 
requests from a user with large contribution has a higher probability to be 
served. In [37], the authors have proposed a service differentiated schedul-
ing policy that allocates bandwidth according to the peer's contribution. It 
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showed that the social welfare is maximized when all peers have the same 
contribution value. The authors in [23] have suggested to differentiate the 
service in peer selection process of P2P streaming. By using the rank-based 
peer-selection mechanism, the contributors are rewarded with flexibility and 
choice in peer selection, which results in high quality streaming. For the free-
riders, the options in peer selection are limited, and hence they receive low 
quality streaming. 
Reputation-based Incentive 
Another well-known incentive model is Reputation-based incentive. The rep-
utation reflects a peer's overall contribution to the network. The peers with 
high reputation value have extra privilege over the others. Reputation can 
also be used to identify how reliable and trustful a peer is. In fact, this kind 
of incentive has already been deployed in the KaZaA file sharing system [32j, 
which is called the participation level. It is defined base on the megabytes 
the user transferred and the integrity of the files served. Downloading prior-
ity is given to the users with high reputation score. In [21], the authors have 
suggested two alternative computation mechanisms to compute dynamically 
the reputation score of each peer in the network. The reputation score gives 
a general idea of the peers' level of participation in the system. The peers 
having high reputation is more likely to obtain better service. Based on the 
reputation system, [52] have suggested how to monitor the users behavior in 
a streaming network, and it tried to maintain a satisfactory level of service 
for the collaborative peers. The authors in [17] have used the generalized 
prisoner's dilemma to model the system, and they have proposed a family of 
incentive techniques. A history of a peer's actions is mapped to a decision 
whether to cooperate with or defect on that peer. The strategies, consisting 
of: 1) A decision function; 2) Action history; 3) A server selection mecha-
nism; and 4) A stranger policy, were designed to maximize both individual 
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and social benefit. Similar approach was adopted in [30]. They used it-
erated prisoner's dilemma to model the peers' interaction, and proposed a 
reputation-based trust model with incentive mechanism incorporated. 
Contribution Reward-based Incentive 
Our work is different from the above schemes that we follow the Contribu-
tion reward-based incentive approach, where monetary reward is given to 
the peers in proportional to their contribution. A micro-payment mecha-
nism have been proposed in [19] to reward users for upload. Game theoretic 
model was used to analyze the equilibrium of user's strategy under several 
different payment schemes. The results demonstrated that the users are 
encouraged not only to upload files, but also to share new files to the P2P 
system. In [44], a credit-based trading mechanism have been presented for 
P2P file sharing. In the model, peers ,who exchange pieces of a file, use 
a pairwise currency to reconcile trading differences with each other. As a 
result, the peers who set high upload rates receive high download rates in 
return. The authors also proposed a trading strategy that is good for both 
the network as a whole and the peers employing it. The monetary scheme 
provides a clean economic model for the incentive mechanism. However, 
it is argued to be impractical in P2P system, where a reliable accounting 
infrastructure has to be established to track the transactions between every 
peers. In contrast, it's application in our coordinated system with central-
ized authority is viable because the payment is made in a single direction 
only, i.e. from the service provider to the proxies. We are aware of a similar 
work in [48], which also considered revenue rewarding to the contributed 
peers. They model the P2P system as a Cournot Oligopoly game and used 
control-theoretic to maximize individual net gain. System performance re-
quirements, like storage utilization and bandwidth stress, were considered as 
the global desirable properties, and they were incorporated in the dynamic 
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payoff function of the proxies. Our work is different from it as we model the 
system as a Stackelberg game, and we focus on maximizing the net profit 
and social utility in the network. 
2.3 Resource Pricing 
Our work relies on pricing the resource in order to regulate users' contribu-
tion. The pricing aspects of P2P network have received little attention so 
far. Previous research appears mainly focus on server-client model. Game-
theoretic and economic model were applied to predict the influence of the 
price to the users' behavior. Some pricing mechanisms were suggested to 
maximize the revenue and the social welfare in the network. A charge-
per-usage pricing model was studied in [6], where the users are charged for 
their bandwidth usage. By analyzing the strategies of the users toward the 
price, the optimal price is computed to maximize the revenue of the ser-
vice provider. It also showed that the pricing scheme provides an incentive 
for the service provider to increase the network capacity. In [9], the au-
thors have proposed an adaptive pricing strategy that adjusts the price in 
realtime manner, and the objective is again to maximize the revenue for 
the service provider. Their work assumed prior knowledge about the user 
arrival pattern, and thus it may not be appropriate for the P2P system 
with highly dynamic nodes. On the other hand, [25] have proposed a fair 
revenue-sharing policy, based on the weighted proportional fairness crite-
rion, to distribute profit between cooperative provider. The fair allocation 
policy encourages collaboration among the providers, and hence produces 
higher profit for all the providers. We also adopt the proportional fairness in 
rewarding the revenue to the proxies. The authors in [22] described a pric-
ing strategy for carrying out lookups in P2P networks. Both the resource 
provider and intermediate nodes, which assists in routing, are compensated 
so as to cover their cost of providing service. Vickrey auction, where the 
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 15 
highest bidder wins the auction by paying the second highest bid, is used 
by the nodes to determine the price of the resource. The proposed protocol 
ensures that the rewards received by the involved nodes are maximized. We 
apply similar approach to reward the contributors in the cooperative proxy 
caching system, but suggest different pricing strategy to achieve different 
objective. 




In this chapter, we present COPACC [29], a novel cooperative proxy-and-
client caching system. We first give an overview of the COPACC system, and 
point out the key issues addressed in the COPACC architecture. Then, we 
present an efficient cache allocation algorithm as well as a comprehensive 
suite of cooperative caching protocols. Lastly, we evaluate the COPACC 
system with different performance metrics. 
3.1 Overview of the COPACC System 
Fig. 3.1 depicts a generic architecture of COPACC. A cluster of proxies 
are logically connected through direct or indirect peer links to form a proxy-
overlay, and each of them serves as the home proxy for a set of local clients. 
We assume that proxies and their clients are closely located with relatively 
low communication costs, e.g., they could be in the same ISP domain or 
in the same metropolitan area. A server storing the repository of videos, 
however, is far away from them, and the remote communications incur much 
higher costs. 
16 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of different portions of a video stream. The prefix is 
to be cached by proxies, while the prefix-of-suffix by clients. 
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The video data are cached across both proxies and clients. We assume 
that the storage space of a proxy or a client is limited; the videos thus can 
be partially cached only, and there is always a full copy at the server. Specif-
ically, as shown in Fig. 3.2，a video stream is partitioned into a prefix and 
a suffix, and the beginning part of the later is also referred to as the prefix-
of-suffix. The proxies are responsible to cache the prefix of video, whereas 
the clients cache the prefix-of-suffix of video. This setting not only reduces 
the initial playback latency but also facilitates the multicast delivery with 
dynamic clients, as will be illustrated later. When a client expects to play a 
video, it first initiates a playback request to its home proxy, which intercepts 
the request and computes a streaming schedule: when and where to fetch 
which portion of the video. It then accordingly fetches the prefix, prefix-of-
suffix’ as well as the remaining part of suffix, and relays the incoming stream 
to the client. If needed, a proxy may also perform a verification operation, 
which detects forged video data through a simple signature mechanism. 
Considering the video contents and their access patterns are relatively 
stable in several hours or even days, we advocate semi-static caching in 
COPACC. The cached contents are updated only when the system param-
eters have drastically changed, and a cache reconfiguration is then applied 
through a progressive cache filling mechanism. 
There are two key issues to be addressed in the COPACC architecture: 
• How to partition each video and allocate the prefixes and prefix-of-
suffixes to different proxy and client caches? The objective is to min-
imize the total transmission cost of the COPACC system given the 
video access patterns, the heterogeneous transmission costs, and the 
storage constraints. 
• How to manage, search, and retrieve the cached data in different p r o x - . 
ies and clients? These operations should be highly efficient so as to 
deploy COPACC in large-scale networks with intensive requests. 
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To address the above challenges, we present an efficient allocation al-
gorithm as well as a comprehensive suite of cache management and search 
protocols in the next two sections. Before proceeding our discussions, we 
first list the notations and parameters for COPACC, which are also summa-
rized in Table 3.1. 
We assume that there are H cooperative proxies, indexed from 1 through 
H, and proxy j serves as the home proxy for Kj local clients. The video 
repository at the server includes N Constant-Bit-Rate (CBR) videos, and 
video i has length U seconds and rate If bps, i = 1 , 2 , N . The total 
average access rate at proxy j is Xj，and the probability for accessing video 
i is f j (X) iLofj — 1). We assume such statistics are known a priori, or 
obtained through online monitoring. 
For cache allocation, there is a basic unit of u, also called cache grain, 
which is a hardware or operating system constraint, e.g., the size of a disk 
block. The cache space for proxy j is s^ units, and that for client k of proxy 
j is Sjj^  units. The volume of video i is also represented as a number of 
units, i.e., V^ = h^Uju units. In practice, the aggregated cache space is 
less than the total volume of all the videos, i.e. + < where 
SP = and S" = E j L i E f i i ^ f c are the total proxy cache size and 
total client cache size. 
The cost for transmitting one unit of data from the server to a proxy 
is denoted by ujS—p, and, similarly, the unit cost from proxy j to proxy k 
and that from proxy j to its own clients are represented by w�工p and ^^�"^, 
respectively. 
We use P^ to denote the prefix size (in units) of video i, and, the 
prefix-of-suffix size. Both the prefix or prefix-of-suffix of a video are further 
partitioned into several segments and cached at a proxy or client. For video 
2, the size of a prefix segment cached in proxy j is represented by Pj, and 
the size of a prefix-of-suffix segment cached at the client k of proxy j is 
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Parameter Definition 
N Number of the videos. 
V^ Volume of video i (in units). 
H Number of proxies. 
K Number of clients. 
Kj Number of local client attached to proxy j . 
s^ Cache space of proxy j (in units). 
SP Total cache space of all proxies (in units), 
s义& Cache space of client k of proxy j (in units). 
Total cache space of all clients (in units). 
\j Total access rate at proxy j . 
fj Probability for accessing video i at proxy j. 
秘s—p Transmission cost per unit data from server to proxy. 
Transmission cost per unit data from proxy j to proxy k. 
w厂P Transmission cost per unit data from proxy j to its client. 
w^ ^ Internal cost per unit data of a proxy 
pi Prefix size of videos i (in units). 
p) Size of the prefix segment of video i cached in proxy j. 
Q^ Prefix-of-suffix size of videos i (in units). 
Qj Size of the prefix-of-suffix segment of video i cached at 
client k of proxy j. 
Table 3.1: Parameters of the COPACC system. 
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The segment sizes are to be determined by the cache allocation algorithm, 
and the exact positions of the segments are to be determined by the cache 
organization protocol. 
3.2 Optimal Cache Allocation (CAP) 
The optimal cache allocation problem (CAP) in COPACC can be formulated 
as follows, 
CAP:minCost({p5},{g}^J), (3.1) 
EjLiPj + E j L i E 么欢 fcSvS 
where Cost[{py\, {q^ is the function of the total transmission cost (per 
unit time) given allocation {pj} and {� ’& } ; the second and third constraints 
follow the cache space limit of proxy j and that of client k of proxy j•，respec-
tively; the forth constraint applies because we do not consider replication in 
this study. In this section, we start our discussion from a simple scenario of 
no cooperation between proxies, where the cache allocation for each proxy 
and its own clients can be examined independently. We derive an efficient 
optimal solution for this scenario, which is then extended to accommodate 
multiple cooperative proxies with client caching, i.e., a general COPACC 
system. 
3.2.1 Single Proxy with Client Caching 
As said, we focus on a single proxy and its clients, both of which contribute 
cache spaces, but there is no interactions with other proxies nor their clients. 
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Since the transmission costs between this proxy and all its clients are iden-
tical, we refer to this system as a homogeneous cost system. We drop the 
proxy index (subscript j) from the relevant parameters for ease of exposition. 
This homogeneous cost system has a nice property that the total trans-
mission cost depends only on how the video streams are partitioned into 
prefixes and prefix-of-suffixes for caching. This is because all prefixes are 
to be cached at the single proxy, and any allocation of the prefix-of-suffix 
segments across the local clients yield the same cost due to the uniform cost 
for proxy-client transmissions. As such, we can combine the cache of all the 
clients to form an aggregated cache space S ,^ and, to derive the minimum 
transmission cost, we only need to find the optimal values of {P^} and {Q^} 
subject to cache space constraints S^ and S .^ 
We define an auxiliary cost function which is the cost for 
delivering video i with prefix size P�and prefix-of-suffix size Note that 
Cosi({pj}, {^jjt}) is now equal to Q )^ in this simple scenario. 
Moreover, minimizing it is equivalent to maximizing the cost saving against 
the system with no caching, i.e. maximizing 乂0,0) -
We use a dynamic programming approach to solve the problem. Let B 
be a three-dimensional matrix, where Bii.fP.t^) represents the maximum 
cost saving for videos 1 through i { l < i < N ) , when t^  (0 < < S^) units 
of proxy cache and t�(0 < t^ < S^) units of client cache are used. We have 
0， z = 0, 0 < tP < 0 < < 
= max{B{i -l,tP- v^, t^ - ？；^) + 0) -
0 <vP <tP,0 ^v"" < If, yP + v''^ V\ 
\ 
The matrix can be filled in plane-order starting from B(0,0’ 0) to B{N, S^, S�)� 
and the latter gives the maximum cost saving. The minimum total trans-
mission cost is therefore J] 吻 , 0 ) - B { N , 5"”，and the corresponding 
prefix and prefix-of-suffix partitioning can be obtained through backtracking 
the iterations. 
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Figure 3.3: A logical view of multi-proxy with client caching. 
This dynamic programming algorithm has time complexity 0 � N • ， S �• 
M), where M = maxi<i<Ar(l+ It is applicable with arbitrary cost 
function C^(P\ which can be instantiated given a specific transmission 
scheme. As an example, assume both a server-to-client and a client-to-client 
transmissions are unicast-based and relayed by a proxy, can be 
derived as A / � [ i / Z ^ i户 + 切 — 切 i n ( 户 + 
Q^)], where the first four terms in the second part respectively represent 
the costs for retrieving prefix, prefix-of-suffix, the remaining suffix, and the 
internal cost of the proxy, for each playback request. Note that A is the 
total access rate of the proxy, and w^ ^ is the internal cost per unit data 
handled by the proxy. When there is no caching {P^ = Q^  = 0), we have 
0) = V'XP- {w'^P + w^^P). 
In the end of this section, we further introduce multicast delivery to the 
system and derive the corresponding cost function. 
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3.2.2 Multiple Proxies with Client Caching 
We now consider the case of multiple cooperative proxies with client caching. 
Fig. 3.3 offers a logical view of this general COPACC system, in which the 
segment of prefix and prefix-of-suffix of a video are placed across different 
proxies and their clients, respectively, and the transmission of a video stream 
thus involve interactions among several proxies and clients. Moreover, the 
unit transmission costs for the proxy-to-proxy and client-to-proxy links can 
be heterogeneous. The cache allocation problem (CAP) thus becomes much 
more complex than in the homogeneous cost system. 
In fact, we formally prove that CAP is NP-hard in this general case 
(see Appendix A). We thus resort to a practically efficient heuristics, which 
consists of two phases: first, it partitions the prefix and prefix-of-suffix for 
each video; second, given the partitions, it allocates the segments of prefixes 
and prefix-of-suffixes to the proxies and clients. 
1) Partitioning of prefix and prefix-of-suffix: In this phase, we cal-
culate the optimal values of P^ and Q^  for each video, and, to achieve a 
computationally efficient solution, we do not address their allocation across 
the proxies and clients. Instead, we approximate the system by a sin-
gle proxy system with aggregated proxy cache space S^ and aggregated 
client cache space S .^ Other parameters are approximated as follows: video 
access rate A = Z^jLiA?.’ access probability f = (1/A) JZ^iAj / ] , unit 
transmission cost w^'^p = (1 /幻 E^Li^^O切】and internal cost w奴= 
that is, we consider the cost for proxy-to-proxy 
transmissions as an internal cost, and assume is 0 if j = k. 
Given the above transformation, an approximate solution can be directly-
obtained using the dynamic programming algorithm for the homogeneous 
cost system, 
2) Allocation to proxy and client caches: In this phase, we allocate 
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the prefix and prefix-of-suffix to the proxies and clients so as to meet the 
storage constraints at each proxy and client. Since given and obtained 
in the first phase, the allocation for prefixes to proxy caches is independent 
from that for prefix-of-suffixes to client caches, and vice versa, we separate 
the two allocation problems and solve them individually. 
We first consider the allocation for prefixes. Let be the trans-
mission cost when the segment of size p) from the prefix of video i is stored 
in proxy j . The problem for optimal prefix allocation is then formulated as 
PA : min X； fU E j , P ) ) (3-2) 
s.t. T.f=iP) = P\ 
For unicast delivery, WP{i,j,Pj) can be instantiated as 
= [ < 7 + 切 r i V / ) ' . (3.3) 
Let WP{i,j) = WjJ,^  + Wj^^ V / j / ’ the optimization objective 
for problem PA can be re-written as ‘ P)- Note 
that, is independent of p》，and can be viewed as the transmission 
cost when each unit prefix data of video i cached in proxy j. The above 
formulation for PA thus can be relaxed as a linear programming problem 
if p) is not restricted to integers. In practice, this is generally viable, for 
a video stream that can be partitioned with fine-granularity, and the total 
data cached in any proxy is less than its maximum capacity for any optimal 
solution to the linear programming. 
Similarly, we can formulate the optimal allocation problem for prefix-of-
suffixes to be cached at clients as follows, 
S A : min X： f=i E f=i E � 4恢 c ( i ’ j, k, gj,,) (3.4) 
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where j ’ fc, is the transmission cost when the segment of size q “ 
from the prefix-of-suffix of video i is stored in client k of proxy j. For unicast 
delivery, Wc(i，j,/c’�. J is given by 
+ + ^ n ^ f f h (3.5) 
which can be re-written as k) . qfj if we define 
j ’ k) = + � + 切 ; 1 Aj'/j,. (3.6) 
Obviously, both the cost function and the problem S A itself have similar 
structure as that of problem PA. The linear programming relaxation thus 
also applies. 
We will show later that such relaxation also holds for multicast delivery. 
3.2.3 Cost Function with Suffix Multicast 
So far we have focused on unicast delivery only, and presented the corre-
sponding cost functions. In this subsection, we further consider multicast 
delivery, which is known as an efficient vehicle for streaming to clients with 
requests close in time [46，4]. However, though IP multicast has been widely 
adopted within ISP networks, its deployment over the global Internet re-
mains confined. We thus assume multicast delivery at the path from a proxy 
to its local clients, but only unicast delivery from the server to a proxy or 
between two proxies. 
Even though multicast is only enabled at local paths, a proxy can still 
serve a series of requests from its local clients for the same video using a suffix 
batching technique. Specifically, assume the first request for video i arrives 
at time 0, the home proxy will fetch and relay the prefix of the video to this 
client through unicast, which takes P^u/h^ seconds; all the local requests 
arrive during interval [0’ P^u/U] will then be batched with a single copy of 
the suffix for video i being multicast to all the requested clients. In other 
words, the batching window is of size P^u/lf. 
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We now derive the cost function for the case of single-proxy 
with client caching. We assume that the video accesses follow a Poisson ar-
rival, that is, the average number of requests arrived in the batching window 
for video i is 1 + {P^u/b^){Xf). The cost per request for multicasting the 
suffix to batch of clients is thus — + vjCiQi + w^-^ i^y^ - -
Q') + + {P'u/b'){Xf)]. Since a prefix is always delivered using 
unicast, the cost function Q )^ is then given by: 
,切 yi _ pi) + + _pi_ gi) + ^iuQi 
了 t 1 + { P ' u / b ' ) { x p ) 十“"^ ) 上 . 
(3.7) 
Similarly, we can derive the cost function k) of problem SA. For 
a batching windows contains 1 + [P� /b i ) [Xj i f��requests from proxy we 
need only a single retrieval for the suffix distributed at client caches and the 
server. The cost function k) at proxy j is thus 
- J 
Regarding the cost function WP{i,j) of problem PA, it is exactly the 
same as that for unicast case because a prefix is delivery through unicast 
only. In addition, if / ! = = ••• = fn, we have the following observations 
for WP(iJ): 
• Given i�i' € [l.:.iV]’ WP{i,3)lWP[i'is a constant for any j e 
[1….机 
• Given j , j ' e [ l . . . i f ] , is a constant for any i 6 
[I...N]. 
Since clients often have common interests, it is likely that the distribu-
tions of video access probabilities are similar at different proxies, that is, 
f\ — fi. — ••• — fh holds. The above observation thus leads to an sim-
pler yet optimal greedy algorithm for problem PA, as shown in Fig. 3.4. 
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1: Sort proxies in ascending order of cost WP{l,j)； 
Store the results in j-List; 
2： Sort videos in descending order of cost 1); 
Store the results in z-List; 
3： j* first component of j-List; 
i* first component of z-List; 
4: Cache as many units as possible for the prefix of video i* to proxy 
r； 
5: If proxy j* has cache space left, then i* — next component of z-List; 
6: If prefix of video i* has not been fully cached, then j* — next com-
ponent of j-List; 
7: Repeat steps 4 to 6 until all prefixes are allocated. 
Figure 3.4: Greedy prefix allocation 
Intuitively, this algorithm always cache the most expensive prefix into the 
cheapest proxy, so as to minimize the total transmission cost. Its complex-
ity is 0{NlogN), which is generally lower than directly solving the linear 
programming problems (even if the simplex method [15] is used). A formal 
proof of the optimality of this greedy algorithm can be found in Appendix 
B. 
3.3 Cooperative Proxy-Client Caching Protocol 
As shown in Fig. 3.1, COPACC operates as a two-level overlay, where the 
first level consists of all the proxies, and the second level consists of each 
proxy and its own clients. The interactions among different entities in this 
two-level overlay are specified by a cooperative proxy-client caching proto-
col, which consists of three subprotocols: cache allocation and organization, 
cache lookup and retrieval, and client access and integrity verification. We 
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now detail the operations, and address the practical issues toward realizing 
the COPACC system. 
3.3.1 Cache Allocation and Organization 
All the cache allocation and organization decisions are implemented in prox-
ies. The protocol starts by establishing connections among the proxies, and 
an election algorithm is then executed to choose a coordinator. We currently 
employ the distributed Bully algorithm [18], which opts for the proxy of the 
highest computational power as the coordinator. The coordinator is respon-
sible for collecting parameters from all other proxies and then running the 
optimal cache allocation algorithm described in the previous section. 
Given = E^LiPj and Q �= E f = i E【么？丄^：’ the interval of the 
prefix in video stream i is simply [0, and that of prefix-of-suffix is 
[P'-u/b^ Q^u/b ]^. The coordinator should then determine the position of each 
segment to be allocated to proxies and clients in the prefix and prefix-of-
suffix, Since the total transmission cost depends only on the segment size, 
COPACC employs a simple organization scheme: for prefix of video i, allo-
cate segment of interval E^^iiPmV^S in the video stream to 
proxy j , and, for the prefix-of-suffix, allocate interval [ E C i E ^：！工^^^’打収/石^  
to the clients of proxy j�which further partitions this 
interval into segments to be cached in its local clients according to their cache 
spaces. Hence, the cache location of each interval of the stream can be eas-
ily calculated from { p � } and {《，)J. As the coordinator keeps a full copy 
of the allocations, a lookup request for the cache locations of a particular 
video stream can always be accomplished by contacting the coordinator. To 
balance the load of the proxies, the coordinator also distributes the lookup 
information uniformly to other proxies using a hash function /i(z); that is, 
for video i, a copy of its cache location information are kept by proxy h(i) as 
well. Since the proxies are persistent and reliable nodes, even the simplest 
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hashing like h{i) = (i mod H) I will work well in COPACC. In other 
words, COPACC does not have to rely on a flooding-based search, nor a 
complex and costly distributed hash table (DHT), as in many peer-to-peer 
systems. 
3.3.2 Cache Lookup and Retrieval 
For each playback request for video i from a client, its home proxy discovers 
and retrieves the video data on behalf of its clients. This is accomplished 
by first issuing a cache lookup request 丑Zoofcup [幻，which, according to the 
cache organization, can be directly submitted to proxy h[i). Upon receiving 
the location information from proxy h(i), the initiated proxy then issues a 
series of cache retrieval requests, Rretrieval [^ ]) to corresponding proxies for 
retrieving and then relaying the segments cached at proxies or their clients. 
Finally, the un-cached part of the suffix is retrieved from the server. 
When a proxy receives a retrieval request, it first checks whether the 
requested data has been cached. If cached, it will stream the data to the re-
quested proxy; if not, it will retrieve the data from the server, stores a copy 
in its own cache or its clients' cache, depending on whether the content be-
longs to a prefix or to a prefix-of-suffix, and then stream to the initiated 
proxy. This leads to a passive filling scheme with no need for a synchro-
nized global replacement: the cache space are initially empty or represents 
an outdated allocation scheme; it is then filled up gradually following the 
requests from other proxies, which represents the updated allocation. An 
illustration of the steps for cache lookup and retrieval can be found in Fig. 
3.5 and Fig. 3.6. 
3.3.3 Client Access and Integrity Verification 
The client-side operations are relatively simple, which can be easily imple-
mented in economical but less powerful personal computers. In particular, 
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1： while Receive a request do 
2: if Rretrievai � from local client then 
3: Look up proxy j = h(i); get {pj} and { � } 
4: Send Rretrievai [^ ] to proxy j for prefix of interval 
5: Send Rretrievall'i] to proxy j for prefix-of-suffix of interval 
6： Retrieval remaining interval [严 + L” from server 
7: Relay the stream to the request client 
8: else if Rretrievai [^ ] for prefix of interval [a, b] then 
9: Prefix of interval [a, b] not exist in proxy cache —> retrieval from 
server and store in proxy cache 
10： Send prefix of interval [a, b] to requested proxy 
11: else if Rretrievai H for prefix-of-suffix of interval [a, b] then 
12： Prefix of interval [a, b] not exist in the cache of any local client 
—>• retrieval from server and store in a local client's cache 
13： Send prefix-of-suffix of interval [a, b] to requested proxy 
14： else if Riookup[i\ from another proxy then 
15: Reply {p]} and {gj} 
16： end if 
17： end while 
Figure 3.5: Cache Lookup and Retrieval. 
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(1) client request to home proxy for video %\ 
(2) location lookup request to proxy B = h(i)] 
(3) retrieve and relay prefix segments from proxy cache; 
(4) retrieve and relay prefix-of-suffix segments from clients; 
(5) retrieve and relay the remaining part of suffix from server. 
Figure 3.6: An illustration of the cache lookup and retrieve operations. 
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a client is not involved in managing the overlay, nor determining cache al-
location and organization. It simply reports its available spaces to its home 
proxy. The home proxy then determines and keeps the location for data 
cached in its local clients, and then instructs the clients for caching the 
data. For each cached segment in the client, the home proxy also save a 
signature of the copy, such as its SHA-1 hash value. A client contributes its 
cached data only upon a request from its home proxy. The home proxy will 
then relay the data to the proxy initiated the request, and if needed, verify 
the integrity of the data using the signature. As such, the system can easily 
identifies and blocks malicious clients. 
3.4 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of COPACC. We focus on 
the transmission cost reduced by introducing cooperative caching among 
proxies and clients. We are also interested in examining the robustness and 
scalability of this system, as well as identifying the key influential factors. 
Unless otherwise specified, the following default settings are used in our 
evaluation. The video repository in the sever contains 100 CBR videos each 
of 512 Kbps rate. Their lengths are uniformly distributed in between 100 
and 140 minutes; the mean (120 minutes) is a typical length of a movie. 
As suggested by existing studies on media access patterns, we assume the 
access probabilities of the videos follow a Zipf distribution with skew factor 
9 = 0.271 [4]. The cache grain (unit) is set to the size of 2-minute video data. 
All the cache sizes discussed in this section are normalized by the total size 
of the video repository, and the transmission costs are normalized by the 
corresponding cost of a system with no cache. Therefore, our conclusions 
are also applicable to systems with proportionally scaled parameters. 
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Figure 3.7: Transmission cost as a function of the total proxy-client cache 
space. SP : = 
3.4.1 Effectiveness of Cooperative Proxy and Client Caching 
A primary design objective of COPACC is to reduce the transmission cost 
for streaming to clients of asynchronous requests. Hence, in the first set of 
experiments, we examine the cost reduction under various proxy and client 
configurations. 
We assume there are 4 proxies cooperated with each other, and the client 
access rate at each proxy is 50 requests per minutes. The ratio between the 
unit transmission costs of different paths is set to w^ 一p : p : = 10 : 
3 : 1 . Note that, this setting is indeed conservative as compared to that in 
many previous studies [46]. In addition, we are interested in the normalized 
transmission cost, which depends on this ratio, while not the exact value at 
each path. 
Fig. 3.7 plots the transmission cost as a function of the total cache space 
in the system, where S^ : S^ = 1 : 1, i.e., the proxies and clients respectively 
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE PROXY-AND-CLIENT CACHING 35 
1 
• Server-to-proxy cost 
0.8 - • Proxy-to-proxy cost 
0 





兰 I • 
• 0.2 - I 
o i L K I x iTl^ J U JT^ n^ 
0.02 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Total cache space 
Figure 3.8: Transmission cost at different paths with suffix mulitcast. 
contribute half of the total cache size. Not surprisingly, increasing the total 
space reduces transmission cost. With unicast, the cost decreases linearly, 
while with suffix multicast, it decreases much faster. When the total cache 
space is 0.2 (20% of the video repository), the cost with suffix multicast has 
been reduced to 0.2; in other words, a 20% cache space leads to a 80% cost 
reduction, which implies that batching the requests from local clients can 
avoid a significant amount of remote transmissions (server-to-proxy). This 
can also be verified by Fig. 3.8，which shows the cost due to server-to-proxy 
transmissions quickly decreases with an increase of the cache space, and 
becomes a minor part in the total transmission cost when the cache space 
is over 0.4. 
In Fig. 3.7, we also show the cost when a proxy cooperates with its 
clients only, while not with other proxies. Clearly, the cost with cooperative 
proxies are much lower, particularly when multicast is also enabled in local 
paths. As such, in the following discussions, we focus on the results with 
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Figure 3.9: Transmission cost versus the fraction of the proxy cache space 
in the total cache space, r = Sp/{SP + x 100% 
cooperative proxies and multicast delivery only. 
To further identify the respective contributions of proxy caching and 
client caching, Fig. 3.9 depicts the transmission cost versus the fraction of 
the proxy cache space in the total cache space. We can see that the transmis-
sion cost reduces when the proxies contribute a higher fraction in the total 
cache space of the system. Intuitively, the more cache space contributed by-
proxies, the more direct transmissions among proxies for delivering a video 
stream, which generally incur lower costs, because the video data fetched 
from a client's cache have to be relayed by proxies as well. The best perfor-
mance is thus achieved when all cache space is in the proxies. Nonetheless, 
it is often expensive to upgrade dedicated proxies and add more disk spaces. 
On the other hand, from Fig. 3.9, we find that, even if the proxy caches 
constitute a small part in the total cache space, a near optimal cost can still 
be achieved. As an example, when the total cache space is 0.6 and only 
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Figure 3.10: Transmission cost versus client failure probability. 
20% is from proxies, i.e., the total proxy cache space is only 0.12, the cost is 
already less than 0.13, which is quite close to the optimal value (around 0.1) 
when the fraction of proxy cache is 100%. In other words, client caching well 
complements proxy caching, making COPACC a very economical alternative 
to pure proxy caching. 
3.4.2 Robustness 
As in peer-to-peer streaming systems, the robustness in the presence of client 
failures is also a critical concern in COPACC. To evaluate this, we assume 
that each client has certain failure probability when its own cache is ac-
cessed, but the video access rate from all clients remains constant. In Fig. 
3.10，we show the transmission cost as a function of different client failure 
probabilities. The total cache space of the system is 0.4，and we vary, r, the 
fraction of the total proxy cache space in the total cache space from 0% to 
100%, which represents two extreme cases: when r = 0%, COPACC degen-
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erates to a pure peer-to-peer system, and, when r = 100%, it degenerates 
to a pure proxy-based system. 
We can see that, when there is no client failure, the costs for different 
r are quite close if there are certain cache spaces existing in proxies, and 
the pure proxy-based scheme is the best, which has been explained previ-
ously. More importantly, the cost of the pure proxy-based system remains 
unchanged when increasing client failures, and that for 0% < r < 100%, 
or a normal COPACC system, is also very stable. For illustration, even if 
r is 25%, the transmission cost only slightly increases with an increase of 
failure probability; when the failure probability is 1, the cost remains a low 
as 0.22. This is because even if a suffix is to be fetched from the server in the 
presence of client failures, the overhead, shared by a batch of clients, is not 
excessive. To the contrary, the cost of the pure peer-to-peer system quickly 
increases and reaches 1 (the cost of a zero-cache system), when all clients 
fail. Such results demonstrate that the use of dedicated proxies with suffix 
batching remarkably improves the robustness and resilience of COPACC in 
the presence of client failures, even if the total proxy cache space is minor 
as compared to the total client cache space. 
3.4.3 Scalability and Control Overhead 
We further explore the scalability of COPACC with larger number of proxies 
and clients. Fig. 3.11 shows the total transmission costs for different num-
ber of proxies and clients. In this set of experiments, the cache space of each 
proxy, sj, is set to 0.03’ and that of each client, sj^, is 0.005. The access 
rate from each client is set to 0.01 per minute. In other words, while a client 
joining the system contributes certain cache spaces, it also introduces more 
requests. Yet, we observe that the transmission cost slightly decreases with 
more clients, implying that client caching overcomes the increased loads. 
Note that the normalized cache space of each client is only 0.005’ or equiv-
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Figure 3.11: Transmission cost with different numbers of proxies and clients. 
alently, the half size of one video, which can be easily accommodated by 
personal computers. With an increase of the number of proxies, we have ob-
served a even more noticeable cost reduction, particularly when the number 
is changed from 1 to 5. This again confirms that proxy cooperation is worth 
considerations. 
The control overhead is also an important concern toward realizing CO-
PACC. We define the overhead of COPACC as the traffic volume of control 
messages (election, allocation, lookup, and retrieval, etc.) over the total 
traffic volume, which obviously depends on the scale and streaming rate of 
the system. In Fig. 3.12, we show the overhead with different number of 
proxies and streaming rates. The number of clients per proxy is set to 50. It 
can be seen that the overhead is reasonably low, which is less than 1% of the 
total traffic even with 20 proxies. In addition, the overhead decreases with 
higher streaming rates. This is mainly because the messages are quite short 
as compared to video segments, and most messages are locally exchanged. 
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3.4.4 Sensitivity to Network Topologies 
So far, we focus on regular network topologies with identical transmission 
costs between proxies. We have also investigated the performance of our 
system under various synthetic and real network topologies. Fig 3.13 shows 
the costs under three representative topologies: the 44-node SprintLink net-
work and the 100- and 200-node Transit-Stub (TS) networks. The Sprint-
Link network, representing the topology of a typical backbone network in 
north America, is obtained from the Rocketfuel project at the University of 
Washington [43]. The TS network is synthesized by the GT-ITM topology 
generator [53], which attempts to reproduce the hierarchical structure of the 
Internet by composing interconnected transit and stub domains. For both 
topologies, we randomly place the given number of proxies to the network 
nodes, and set the link cost inversely proportional to the bandwidth of each 
link. A shortest-path routing is then used to determine the path between 
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Figure 3.13: Transmission cost as a function of the number of proxies under 
real and synthetic network topologies. 
proxies, and the cost of a path is the sum of costs across all the link of this 
path. The server is connected to these proxies through a remote link: in 
SprintLink network, it is assumed to be in Asia, and in TS network, we 
manually set the unit transmission cost to 5 times the average cost between 
proxies. 
It can be seen that, under all the three network topologies, the trans-
mission costs of COPACC are pretty low and generally decrease with an 
increase of the number of proxies. The performance under the TS topology 
is slightly better, suggesting that COPACC works well with a hierarchical 
network structure, where local transmission cost is much lower than remote 
transmission cost. It is worth noting that SprintLink network also follows a 
hierarchical structure, but many low-level nodes are abstracted into a single 
nodes. Moreover, the proxies in our evaluation are randomly placed. We 
thus expect a even better performance when the proxies are strategically 
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placed and cooperated with each other in closer distances. 
Overall, the evaluations demonstrate that COPACC achieves remarkably 
lower transmission cost as compared to a pure proxy-based caching with 
limited storage space. On the other hand, it is much more robust than a 
pure peer-topeer communication system in the presence of node failures. 
Meanwhile, its computation and control overheads are both kept in low 
levels. 
However, the merits of the COPACC rely on the active participation 
from the proxies and the clients. Thus, an incentive mechanism is essential to 
encourage the network entities to cooperate. Our Incentive-based COPACC 
achieves this by incorporating with a revenue-rewarding scheme to credit 
the proxies who contribute resource in the system. 




In this chapter, we present an incentive mechanism for COPACC to encour-
age the proxies to participate. A revenue-rewarding scheme is proposed to 
reward part of the aggregated transmission cost saved to the contributing 
proxies. We start by giving an overview of the considered proxy caching 
system derived from COPACC. We model the interaction between the prox-
ies under the revenue-rewarding scheme as a resource allocation game, and 
analyze the cache space contributed in a non-cooperative environment. We 
further suggest two cooperative games that achieve different system-wide 
properties. The performance of the three resource allocation games have 
been evaluated, and the results demonstrate that the revenue-rewarding 
scheme provides a strong incentive for different entities to cooperate in the 
network. 
43 
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4.1 System Model 
4.1.1 System Overview 
We consider a cooperative proxy caching system for multimedia streaming. 
The architecture of this caching system is shown in Fig. 4.1. It consists of 
a logical video server, a number of proxies and their clients, and a network 
service provider (NSP). The NSP provides solely the network connection 
service to the entities in the network. The client requests for videos, which 
are streamed from the far-located server to the client through the interme-
diate proxies. The proxies are capable of caching the video stream passing 
through them. Each video is divided into equal-sized segments for caching, 
and whether a segment is being cached in the proxy is determined by the 
cache allocation algorithm. In general, the frequently accessed video seg-
ments are cached in the local proxy to reduce network traffic. The proxies 
are logically connected by direct or indirect links. They cooperate with each 
others by sharing the cached segments among themselves, i.e. a proxy can 
request for a video segment cached in other proxies. 
This is the COPACC architecture proposed in Chapter 3，which is a 
cooperative proxy-and-client caching system. The COPACC system aims 
at reducing the aggregated transmission cost by allocating efficiently the 
video segments to the cache provided by the proxies and clients. According 
to the cache allocation algorithm, videos are partitioned into prefix (-P )^, 
prefix-of-suffix (Q” and the remaining suffix, and the proxies and clients 
are responsible to cache the prefix and prefix-of-suffix respectively. Based 
on the video transmission scheme used (either unicast or multicast), the op-
timal partitioning of the videos are computed to minimize the aggregated 
transmission cost, i.e. the values of P^ and Q^  are determined to minimize 
Ya Cost(P\ The optimal prefix and prefix-of-suffix are further divided 
into smaller segments in order to fit in multiple proxies and clients. Optimal 
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of the cooperative proxy caching system. 
placement of these segments into the proxies and clients is also considered 
to minimize the cost. The merit of the COPACC relies on the proxy co-
operation. However, COPACC did not address the incentive issues for the 
proxy's participation. That is, what motivates each proxy to provide the 
cache space and how much cache space should be allocated. We extend 
COPACC by proposing a revenue-rewarding scheme to provide incentive for 
the proxies to cooperate. 
In order to increase profit, the NSP is keen to admit new clients. How-
ever, since the capacity of the network links is limited, the NSP fails to serve 
a large number of video-streaming users having high bandwidth and short 
delay requirements. Unfortunately, upgrading the network facility is not 
desirable because the investment cost is usually high. A cost effective ap-
proach is to setup a COPACC system to reduce the aggregated transmission 
cost in the network. As such, the same link capacity can accomplish more 
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clients. Hence, the NSP has a strong incentive to encourage the proxies to 
participate in the COPACC system. 
In general, the more the cache, the better the performance of the system 
is. From the NSP's prospective, it wants more cache supplied because in-
sufficient cache space results in a small cost reduction. However, resources 
are not supplied for free. The proxy has to pay certain cost to maintain the 
resources, although the cost is usually implicit. Therefore, the proxies par-
ticipated in the incentive-based COPACC system have to decide carefully 
the amount of cache storage to be contributed. If they contribute too little 
storage, the reward is small; if they contribute too much storage, the cost of 
maintaining the cache is higher than the reward. It is assumed that the cost 
follows the general rule of increasing marginal cost, i.e. the cost of providing 
an additional unit of cache is higher than that of the previous unit. Thus, 
proxies are reluctant to provide too much resources to the system. 
As the consequence, a revenue-rewarding scheme is established by the 
NSP to reward the contributing proxies. The reward, in terms of credit, 
is determined based on the amount of resource shared by the proxy. It is 
proportional to the proxy's contribution. Proxies are rewarded regularly 
for every fixed period of time. Only the proxies with full participation 
throughout the period are qualified for the rewards. This encourages the 
proxies to stay in the network until the end of each period, thus avoiding 
the unpredictable proxy leave in the system. 
An authority, such as the NSP, is responsible to define a price value, 
which specifies how much credit per unit storage should be granted to the 
participating proxy. Ideally, the price should match the demand and supply 
of resource such that social optimal is achieved. However, it is not the 
case in a non-cooperative environment. Given that proxies are selfish in 
nature, they strategically allocate the amount of storage that maximizes 
their benefit only, i.e. maximize the reward minus cost, regardless of other 
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Parameter Definition 
H Number of proxies. 
Si Cache space supplied by proxy i. 
Si Storage capacity of proxy i. 
q Total cache space supplied to the system. 
Ci{si) Cost of supplying Si unit of cache space by proxy i. 
R(q) Revenue of the system with q units of cache space 
supplied. 
P{q) Credit granted to the proxy for each unit of cache 
space supplied. 
Ui(si) Utility of supplying Si unit of cache space by proxy i. 
E(q) Net profit of the NSP in the system with q units of 
cache space supplied. 
SU{si,S2,...’ sh) Social Utility of the system. 
Table 4.1: A summary of the notations. 
proxies. Meanwhile, the NSP wants to achieve the largest benefit by giving 
out less reward. This forms a non-cooperative game between the NSP and 
the proxies that often leads to a non-optimal situation. In this case, the 
proxies tend to over-supply the resource. 
4.1.2 System Formulation 
We use a game-theoretic approach to model the economic of the resource 
supplying from the proxies. There are two kinds of player, the NSP and 
the proxy. The NSP provides network connectivity to the proxies, while the 
proxy provides cache storage to reduce the transmission cost of the system. 
The notations used in this chapter are summarized in Table 4.1. 
There are H proxies cooperating in the system. Let Si be the unit 
of cache space that proxy i decided to allocate to the system, and Si be 
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the maximum storage capacity of the proxy. A feasible Si is the unit of 
cache space the proxy can supply, i.e. 0 < Sj < Si. The sum of the cache 
space supplied to the system is q = ^i- In order to supply Si units 
of cache space, proxy i has to pay Ci(Si), where Ci(si) is the cost function 
of supplying Si from proxy i, and the cost function can be heterogeneous 
between different proxies. In this chapter, we consider the cost function to 
be strictly increasing with convex shape. The cost function for proxy i is 
defined as follows: 
/ 
Aie叫s广bO’ 0 < Si < , � 
Ci{si) = (4.1) 
0， Si = 0. 
\ 
We argue that the exponential cost function is suitable because it reflects 
the general rule of increasing marginal cost. The parameter Ai defines the 
initial cost of setting up the proxy, while 6i determines the increasing rate 
of the cost. For example, a cost function with large value of Ai and 9i have 
a high cost. When 6i is set to zero, the cost function becomes a constant 
meaning that the cost is fixed regardless of the amount of cache supplied. 
Each proxy can assign its own cost function by adjusting the parameters Ai, 
6i and hi. 
The NSP is in charged to estimate the revenue R(q) in the system. For 
example, the revenue function can be obtained from the COPACC system 
by approximating the transmission cost reduction with respect to the total 
cache space q. In general, the more the resources supplied by the peers, 
the higher the revenue. However, the marginal revenue is decreasing as the 
resource increased. When the cache space reaches a specific amount, the 
cost reduction approaches the limit. Thus, we model the revenue function 
as a non-decreasing and concave function, which is defined as 
m = q>0. (4.2) 
In practice, A' and 6' are greater than zero, and A'/9' should be a finite 
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number, as it represents the revenue obtained when there is infinite amount 
of cache. It is less likely that Q' approaches to zero, in which the revenue 
also approaches to zero. 
The price is a function of g, and it is set according to the revenue curve. 
The product of the price and the total available cache unit q should not 
exceed the corresponding revenue. The NSP has its freedom to decide how 
much revenue is rewarded to the proxies, by setting an appropriate price 
function. We suggest two possible ways to define the price function. 
1. Total-rewarded pricing: The price function P(q) is defined as the 
revenue divided by the total resource supplied, i.e. P{q) = R(q)/q for 
q>0. 
2. Marginal-rewarded pricing: The price function P{q) is defined as 
the marginal gain of the system, i.e. = R'(q)-
In general, P{q) is a decreasing function with a convex shape. When 
the amount of resource tends to infinite, the price of each unit of resource 
approaches to zero. The total and marginal-rewarding price are defined as 
follows: 
P ⑷二命 1 - e 一 " ' ( " ' ) }， P O . (4.3) 
P �= A ' e - 伊 q > 0 (4.4) 
We like to emphasize that this methodology is not restricted to use in 
the caching system, but it may also be applied to other P2P system with 
the cost and the rewarding function setup properly. We now present the 
resource allocation game among the proxies in the COPACC. 
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4.2 Resource Allocation Game 
We model the behavior of the proxies and the NSP as a strategic game. All 
proxies (or system administrators who manage the proxy) are rational, and 
they strategically choose the amount of cache Si to maximize their benefit. 
We use a utility function to represent the level of satisfaction of the proxy. 
The utility Ui{si) of proxy i can be measured in terms of its net gain, which 
is equivalent to the reward earned minus the cost to provide the cache. The 
utility is expressed as follow: 
Ui{si) = SiP{q)-Ci{si) . (4.5) 
The resource allocation game is a repeated synchronous game. Each 
proxy can make or change its decision about the amount of cache at the 
beginning of each round. To be realistic and scalable, we assume imperfect 
knowledge of each proxy, meaning that the proxy only knows about the total 
cache space supplied to the system, q, and the price function, P{q). The 
NSP (or proxy coordinator) can publicize the current price and the total 
amount of cache space such that other proxies can obtain the information 
easily. Based on these information, the proxy updates its own strategy in 
each move to maximize its utility. 
4.2.1 Non-Cooperative Game 
In the non-cooperative game, the proxies make decision regardless of the 
other proxies. They choose Si based on the public information: the aggre-
gated cache space and the price function. The objective of each proxy is to 
maximize its own utility with respect to Si over [0，Si]: 
max Ui{si) = SiP{q) - Ci{si). (4.6) 
0<Si<Si 
Given the total cache space q and the price function P(q), the proxy can 
determine its best strategy Si by solving the maximization problem. Note 
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that q is implicitly depends on Sj. If the value of Si is changed, the value of q, 
as well as P(q)’ will be adjusted accordingly. Thus, in the optimization, the 
value of q would be better presented in terms of Si. Let s_i be the amount of 
cache collectively supplied by the proxies except proxy i, then s-i — q' — sj, 
where q' and s\ are the total amount of cache and the amount of cache 
supplied by proxy i respectively in the previous round. The equivalent 
optimization problem is shown as follows: 
max Ui{si) = SiP(si + s-i) - Ci(si). (4.7) 
0<Si<Si 
Specifically, in the COPACC system, the objective function can be writ-
ten as 
( 
S i A ' e - " �广 M - Aie日“Si—M, 0 < Si < 
max Ui{si) = (4.8) 
0 仏 試 0, Si = 0. 
\ 
The marginal-rewarded pricing is used here. This maximization problem 
is simple, and the first-order condition is sufficient to solve the optimal value 
of Si. In general, the game will converge to a Nash equilibrium. However, the 
Nash equilibrium may not be unique as the order of move will influence the 
equilibrium point. The first mover is more likely to get advantage over the 
later mover by supplying more cache space at the beginning. The outcome 
of this non-cooperative game is not desirable since there is no guarantee that 
the equilibrium is socially optimal. 
In the non-cooperative environment, the proxies act selfishly and blindly 
to maximize their utility. The outcome, however, does not meet their ex-
pectation. The utility may be worse than the achievable individual optimal, 
in which the proxies cooperatively decide how much cache to supply. Each 
proxy seems to optimize their individual benefit, but actually the system-
wide behavior does not reflect the optimization of any objective. Without 
the whole view of the system, it is difficult to determine whether the outcome 
(or the Nash equilibrium) is desirable or not. According to different kinds 
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of player in the game, either one of the following system-wide objectives can 
be achieved: 
1. Maximize the net profit of the NSP; 
2. Maximize the social utility among all proxies involved in the system. 
To achieve the above objectives, we suggest two cooperative resource 
allocation games, namely Profit Maximizing Game and Utility Maximizing 
Game. 
4.2.2 Profit Maximizing Game 
Being the NSP, the objective is obvious: it aims to maximize its net profit 
in using COPACC architecture. The net profit, E(q), of the NSP is defined 
as the revenue earned minus the reward paid to the proxies, i.e. 
E{q)=R{q)-qP{q). (4.9) 
It is clear that the net profit is always zero in the total-rewarded pricing. 
Therefore, it is better to use other reward pricing if the NSP wants to earn 
some profit. As shown in Equation (4.9), the net profit is determined by the 
total cache space q supplied to the system , and the NSP can only influence 
the value of q by setting the price function P(q) probably at the beginning 
of the game. Once the price function is set and publicized, the NSP has no 
control about the value of q�which is a Nash equilibrium converged from 
the moves of the proxies over many iterations. 
The non-cooperative game does not lead to a unique Nash equilibrium. 
The main reason is that the aggregated cache space currently supplied to 
the network does affect the price, and thus interferes the proxy's decision. 
For the same price function used, the system may converge to different equi-
librium. There is no guarantee for the NSP to set a particular marginal-
rewarded pricing function that leads to a desirable outcome, which maxi-
mizes its net profit. To ensure the existence of a unique, predictable Nash 
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equilibrium, we simplify the price function to a constant p, which remains 
the same regardless of how much cache is supplied to the network. By setting 
a constant price, we show that the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, 
and the NSP can choose a proper price p to maximize its net profit. 
With this assumption, we have a Stackelberg game[5] that has one leader 
(the NSP) and H non-cooperative Nash followers (the proxies). The NSP 
strategically decides the price p, and the proxies react with the best amount 
of cache Si to supply. This defines a non-cooperative game between each 
independent proxy in the network, with the underlying solution being the 
Nash equilibrium. Each proxy selfishly selects Si to satisfy its objective 
function: 
max Ui{si) = SiP(q) - Ci(si) 二 Sip - Ci{si). (4.10) 
We assume that if the net utility of a proxy is less than or equal to zero, 
it will not participate in the system, and it will be removed from the list 
of proxies. Note that there is a boundary constraint for the variable Si, 
i.e. 0 < Si < Si. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization, 
which can be solved by the method of Lagrangian Multiplier. 
Let {si*}仏1 be a set containing the amount of cache supplied by the 
proxies to the system such that it satisfies 
max Ui{si) = Ui(si*). (4.11) 
0<Si<Si 
One can analytically find the value of s* based on the value of p, using 
the first-order condition. 
in(Si)=p-Cl(Si) = Q (4.12) 
Clisi) = 胁广⑷ = p (4.13) 
+ (4.14) 
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By solving si in Equation (4.13), one can obtain the solution of s*. 
0，Si < 0 
A = Si, 0 < Si < (4.15) 
S~i�Si > Si* 
\ 
Obviously, there is only one value of s* that can satisfy the objective 
function in Equation (4.11). Thus, the game admits one and only one Nash 
equilibrium, i.e. there exists a unique for each value of p. 
Theorem 4.2.2.1. The profit 
TncbxiTYiizing go/me adTfiits one and only one 
Nash equilibrium 
Proof. Consider the second-order differential equation of the utility Ui{si), 
Ul'isi) = -C'/{si). (4.16) 
Since the cost function is defined as a strictly increasing function with 
convex shape, the second-order differential equation should always be posi-
tive, i.e. C;'(Si) > 0. It shows that C/f (si) is always less than zero, and the 
utility function admits at most one maximum. Thus, the strategy of proxy 
i is either s* that satisfies the Equation (4.13) if the maximum located in 
the range of (0, Si), or the boundary value 0 or Si. As each proxy has it own 
unique optimal strategy s* independent of others, a unique does 
exist. • 
Thus, given the value of price p, the NSP can predict the total cache 
space q* contributed to the system, that is 
= (4.17) 
i=l 
If the NSP knows the parameters Ai, 9i and bi of all the proxies, it can 
formulate its own maximization, which aims at maximizing the net profit 
with respect to q*. 
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設 E(q”=R(q*) 一 q*p (4.18) 
Since the total amount of cache space q* is solely depended on the value 
of price p through Equation (4.15) and (4.17), one can rewrite the objective 
function by substituting q* in terms of p. In the COPACC system, if all 
the Si do not violate the feasible constraints, the objective function can be 
rewritten as Equation (4.19). 
_ = R ^ p J ^ + M) - P . p l ^ + (4.19) 
The derivative of q* and Ep{p) with respect to p are shown below. The 
optimal price, p*, can be obtained by solving the first-order condition in 
Equation (4.23). 
^ = (4.20) 
dp pjri^i 
I— 1 
五 = — ( 4 . 2 1 ) 
= 广 I * (4.22) 
Kip) = 0. (4.23) 
Although it is hard to find the close-form solution of the optimal price 
p* for Equation (4.23)，one can solve this optimization efficiently using nu-
merical method. Once the NSP find the optimal price, it can calculate the 
value of all s* using Equation (4.15). If all s* are inactive, i.e. they satisfy 
the condition 0 < sj < 5i, the net profit of the NSP is guaranteed to be 
maximum by setting the optimal price to p*. 
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What if some of the constraints are active, they do not satisfy the bound-
ary condition of Sj? The problem becomes more complicated, but one can 
still find the optimal value of p mathematically. The solution is based on 
the techniques of Lagrangian multiplier. It can be shown that the objective 
function Ep{p), without considering the cache constraints, is a concave func-
tion, and all the constraints regarding Si are linearly. Thus, it is a concave 
programming problem, and there exists a unique solution that satisfies the 
KKT-condition in Equation (4.25)-(4.30). 
H H 
L = E M - f,\si + ^ fiRsi - (4.24) 
i=l i=l 
1=1 i=l 
Mi>0, i = (4.26) 
/^ r > 0 , i = l,…,11 (4.27) 
/n-Si = 0, i = l,…,H (4.28) 
- Si) = 0, i = l,...,H (4.29) 
0 < Si < Si, i = l,...,H. (4.30) 
We now present an algorithmic approach to find the optimal value of 
p, which is derived directly from the KKT-condition. Fig. 4.2 shows the 
profit maximizing algorithm for the NSP in the profit maximizing game. 
It first assumes that the boundary constraints of all Si are inactive, i.e. 
all the cache space Si lie between 0 and Si. Thus, the Equation (4.28) 
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and (4.29) hold only if the and fi^ are zero. The optimization problem 
is now similar to the unconstrained problem in Equation (4.19), and we 
can apply the numerical method stated previously to calculate the optimal 
price p* as well as all Sj. If the Si are feasible, we have obtained the best 
solution. Otherwise, we know that some of the boundary constraints are 
violated, and the corresponding values of ii\ or nf are not equal to zero. In 
that case, the value of Si is forced to be the boundary value (either 0 or Si) 
followed by Equation (4.28) or (4.29). We can identify the active constraints 
of Si from the result obtained in Equation (4.23). If the optimal Si found 
in the unconstrained optimization is less than zero, the proxy should not 
participate in the system. Therefore, we remove the proxy from the system 
by setting Si = 0. If the optimal Si is greater than the maximum capacity 
the proxy can provide, the proxy supplies Si units only, and Si = Si. After 
hard-setting the value of certain Si, we execute the algorithm again to find 
the numerical solution for the optimal value of p. If the outcome of all Si 
are feasible, we get the best solution. Otherwise, we repeat the previous 
steps to adjust the value of Si and execute the algorithm until the resulted 
Si are feasible. In practice, integral value of cache quantity is desired. Thus, 
an additional checking on�Si"| and [s^ J as the solution should be made to 
assure optimality. 
Until now, we assume the NSP knows the characteristic of the cost func-
tion of each proxy such that it can determine the behavior of the proxies, 
and it can construct its own objective function. But one interesting ques-
tion to ask is whether the NSP can maximize its net profit without knowing 
the individual cost function of each proxy. As such, the NSP can only ob-
serve the action of each proxy by setting a probing price. The NSP keeps 
adjusting the price gradually until a desirable profit is obtained. It is analo-
gous to a commodity market, where the optimal price is determined through 
numerous iterations of refinement. 
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Profit Maximizing Algorithm: 
1: declare P = { 1, 2, ... , // indexes of proxy that it's Si 
has not been determined yet 
2: declare = {}; / / indexes of proxy that it's Si is zero 
3: declare P" = {}; / / indexes of proxy that it's Si is Si 
4: for i 1 to H 
5: Si = 0; 
6: end for 
7: while (true) do 
8: q = Ziep Si + Eie尸u A = Eiepi^^^^ + H + Eiepu Sf. 
9: Solve the optimal price p that maximize Ep(p) = R(q) -p - q 
(or find p s.t. E'p{p) = 0); 
10: for i:=lto H 
11: Si = ln{p/Ai9i)/ei + hi] 
12: end for 
13: if 0 < Si < Vz G P then 
14: break; / / end the while loop 
15: end if 
16: declare P^ = {}; / / a temporary set 
17: for i:=lto H 
18: if Si < 0 then 
19: P^ = P^U{i}； 
20: end if 
21: end for 
22: if (Pt - PO ^ 0 then 
23: pi =户； 
24: P = P-户； 
25: continue; / / next iteration of the while loop 
26: end if 
27: for each i e P 
28: if Si > Si then 
29: P " = U {{}• 
30: P = 
31: end if 
32: end for 
33: end while 
34: return p; / / p is the optimal price 
Figure 4.2: Profit Maximizing Algorithm for the NSP in the Profit Maxi-
mizing Game. 
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Figure 4.3: A sample plot of total cache space q versus price p. 
Although the NSP does not know the exact amount of total cache space 
q supplied to the system for each p, it is always true that increasing the 
price leads to a non-decreasing movement of the total cache space. Fig. 
4.3 plots a sample relationship between the total cache space q and the 
price p. Both p and q move non-linearly in the same direction. Due to 
the boundary constraints of Sj, the function relating p and q is continuous 
but not differentiable. Fig. 4.4 plots a sample relationship between the net 
profit Ep{p) and the price. We observe that the value of Ep(p) in Equation 
(4.19) generally increase for small value of p. Then it reaches the global 
maximum, and decreases with increased value of p. 
We now construct a Price Establishing Protocol for the NSP to determine 
the optimal price used in the system. Let's assume the proxies choose the 
best Si to maximize their net utility, stated in Equation (4.10), based on the 
price p given from the NSP. The NSP keeps announcing different value of 
price p, and the proxies reply to the NSP with the amount of cache space 
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Figure 4.4: A sample plot of net profit Ep(p) versus price p. 
it agrees to contribute. Based on the total cache space q supplied by the 
proxies, the NSP decides the best pricing strategy to maximize its net profit. 
It can be thought as a search problem for an optimal value of p without a 
formal equation. 
At the beginning of the protocol, the NSP makes an initial guess of the 
probing price, say p. It announces the price to the proxies, and retrieves the 
corresponding value of q. The net profit Ep{p) can be calculated based on 
the value of p and q. In each iteration, the NSP decides a new probing price 
based on the old price and the percentage change of the net profit. It then 
sets a new price and measure the change of the net profit as compared with 
the old one. The process goes on until the price converges to an optimal 
value, which achieves the maximum profit. 
The search method stated above is the simplest one of the zero-order 
method (or maximization method without derivatives) in the literature. 
Some advanced direct search methods can also be applied in the Price Estab-
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lishing Protocol to achieve global optimization with fast converging speed. 
We suggest to use Pattern Search Method [33] to find the optimal price in 
the protocol. Moreover, other search method that guarantee global optimal 
can also be applied here. 
So far we have presented the way for the NSP to maximize its net profit 
by setting up proper price. Sometimes, the NSP has no preference about 
maximizing its net profit. Instead, the proxies may prefer to maximize 
the social utility among themselves. In this situation, the objective of the 
optimization becomes maximizing the social utility, which is defined as the 
total net utility summed over all proxies. In what follows, we will present 
the utility maximizing game. 
4.2.3 Utility Maximizing Game 
Another system-wide property we would like to achieve is the social utility. 
It reflects the level of satisfaction of the proxies participating in the net-
work. In this subsection, we present a resource allocation game that aims 
at maximizing the social utility of the system. Cooperation of the proxies 
is essential in this optimization. 
The net utility Ui{si) of each proxy supplying Si units of cache is shown in 
Equation (4.5). We define the social utility as the individual utility summed 




The global objective is to maximize the social utility with respect to Si 
subjected to the boundary constraints 0 < s^  < Si, that is 
H H 
max y]Ui{si ) = max Y^[siP(q) - Ci{si)]. (4.32) 
As the value of q equals to JD^i Si and the current price is calculated 
based on the value of q � t h e net utility Ui{si) of proxy i does not solely 
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depends on Si supplied by itself, but also depends on the cache space s- i 
contributed by the other proxies. The multi-variable optimization of the 
above objective function becomes difficult. Even the form of the partial 
derivative with respect to Si is complicated. It is desirable to break down 
the problem into smaller subproblems, and each subproblem can be handled 
easier. 
Fortunately, the objective function in Equation (4.32) can be simplified 
as: 
H r H 
max "^Uiisi) = max q • P { q ) C i { s i ) • (4.33) 
0<Si<5i 二 0<Si<Si [ f^ 
The first term is equivalent to the credit rewarded to the proxies, while 
the second term represents the total cost of providing q units of cache by 
the proxies. Note that with the fixed quantity of cache space q, the first 
term is always constant regardless of the s^ . The social utility varies only 
by adjusting the allocation of s^ . Hence, the best social utility with a fixed 
cache quantity can be obtained when the total cost of providing the cache 
is minimized. The objective function in Equation (4.32) can be rewritten as 
below: 
H � H 
max Ui{si) = max q • P{q) - min y ^ Ci{si) (4.34) 
0<Si<Si 0<q<g [ 0<Si<Si ^ _ 
H 
S.t. q = Xsi (4.35) 
t=l 
H . 
Q = Y . S i . (4.36) 
i=l 
Thus, the problem can be decomposed into two subproblems, namely 
Minimal cost caching problem and Optimal cache quantity problem. 
1. Minimal Cost Caching Problem(MinCost): Find the minimal 
cost to provide q units of cache by the cooperative proxies with respect 
to Si. 
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2. Optimal Cache Quantity Problem(OptQ): Find the quantity of 
cache space q that guarantee best social utility. 
These two subproblems are linked together by the common variable q. In 
the first subproblem, given the value of q, we claim that it is always possible 
to find a unique set of allocation Si that minimizes the total cost. Thus, there 
is a one-to-one mapping between q and Once the first subproblem 
is solved, the whole problem depends only on the variable q, while not the 
actual allocation We then solve the second subproblem by finding 
the optimal value of q, as well as the price P(q), to generate maximum social 
utility. 
We now present the concrete formulation and the proposed solution to 
the subproblems. 
Minimal Cost Caching Problem 
As the name minimal cost caching implied, this subproblem is about finding 
the cheapest way to supply q units of cache space among the proxies. We 
are also interested in the cache space allocated by the proxies that 
minimize the total cost. 
The minimal cost caching problem is formulated mathematically as: 
H 
MinCost: MinCost{q) = min ^  Ci{si) (4.37) 
i=l 
S.t. 0<Si< Su i = l,…,H (4.38) 
H 
Y^Si = q. (4.39) 
i=l 
The formulation like Equation (4.37) is rather common in the field of 
optimization. It can be solved algorithmically using the well-known dynamic 
programming method. Let B(i,j) be a two-dimensional matrix that stores 
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the minimum cost of contributing j units of cache by the first i proxies, 
where I <i < H and 0 < j < q. 
‘ 
C i ( i ) , 0 < i < Sx 
BiiJ) = oo, i = l, Si<j<q 
mill . B{i 一 l,j -k) + Ci(k), 2 <i<H, 0<j<q. 
�0<k<j,k<Si 
(4.40) 
The matrix can be filled in plane-order starting from B{1,0) to B{H, q), 
and the latter gives the minimum cost of providing q units of cache. The 
corresponding Si of each proxy can be obtained through backtracking the 
iterations. This dynamic programming algorithm has time complexity 0{q-
H . M), where M = maxi<i<H 
Although the dynamic programming method solved the MinCost prob-
lem, it is not always desirable because it requires a powerful and dedicated 
node in the network to execute the algorithm centrally. As a consequence, 
a distributive algorithm is generally preferred to solve the problem in the 
network. 
Before proceeding, it is a good idea to understand the mathematical 
solution of this cost minimization problem using optimization theory. Con-
sider the problem stated in Equation (4.37), it is proven as a constrained 
convex optimization problem. 
Theorem 4.2.3.1. MinCost is a constrained convex optimization problem. 
Proof. To show this, we have to prove the truth of the following two state-
ments. 
1. The feasible region of the solution space Si under the constraints is 
convex. 
2. The summation of the individual cost function is a convex function. 
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Statement (1) follows directly from the fact that all the constraints for 
Si are linear. It is obvious that the equality constraint involving q and the 
boundary constraints for each Si are linear equation of Si. Thus, the feasible 
region is a convex set. 
Consider the Hessian matrix of the total cost function, 
C;'(si) 0 0 0 
o ^  0 C''{S2) 0 0 
� ] = (4.41) 
0 0 (7�(S3) 0 
0 0 0 
or 
o A 0, i ^ j 
= { (4.42) 
Cl'isi), i = j. 
Since the cost function Ci(Si) is strictly increasing, the value Cf (si) are 
always positive. The Hessian matrix is positive semi-definite. Thus, the 
total cost function is a convex function. Statement (2) holds. • 
Convexity is a nice property in constrained optimization. In a convex 
optimization, the local minimum is indeed the global minimum. As a result, 
the KKT-condition is the sufficient and necessary condition for optimality. 
In other words, a set of {sJ^q that satisfies the KKT-condition is the 
solution to our cost minimization problem. The KKT-condition for the 
MinCost problem is shown below: 
H H H H 
L{si) = Ciisi) - Si-q)-Y^ + -台i) (4.43) 
1=1 i=l i=l 1=1 
^ r 
^ = C [ { s i ) + = i = …’ H (4.44) 
fi[ > 0, i = l,…,H (4.45) 
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/i?>0, i = l,…,H (4.46) 
fi[si = 0, i = …,H (4.47) 
- Si) = 0, i 二 1,…,11 (4.48) 




The MinCost is a convex optimization problem, meaning that there ex-
ists a unique solution {si}仏！ satisfying the Equation (4.44)-(4.50). The 
optimal cache allocation Si can be determined by solving the set of linear 
equations. We are now ready to present our distributed approach to the 
cost minimization problem. The algorithm is emerged from the mathemat-
ics above. 
We start with a simplified version of the MinCost problem in Equation 
(4.37), having the storage constraints removed from each proxy. It becomes 
an equality constrained problem, which can be solved by the method of La-
grange multiplier. The necessary condition is similar to the KKT-condition 
stated previously, but with the equations involving ji\ and /x" omitted. Note 
that the plus or minus sign of the multiplier term does not affect the solution. 
H H 
L{si) = Y. Ci�-入(E Si - q) (4.51) 
z = l i = l 
Q J^ 
— = C [ { s i ) - A = 0, i = l,…,H (4.52) 
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H 
^ S i = q. (4.53) 
1=1 
We instantiate the cost function according to the COPACC system. 
Given Equation (4.52)，we can derive Si in terms of A. 
C'iisi) = AiOie '^^ ''- '^^  = A (4.54) 
The variable A is called shadow price, which is introduced by the proxies 
to establish implicitly the best cache allocation among them. The equation 
of Si is similar to the one shown in Equation (4.14), but in here we have one 
more condition about the total cache quantity (in Equation (4.53)) to hold. 
By substituting Si to Equation (4.53), we can solve the value of A, and thus, 
the values of all Sj. 
(4.56) 
1=1 L � -
A = e . (4.57) 
If we have all the parameters about the individual cost function of each 
proxy, we can find the optimal A as well as the Si directly. However, in 
the distributed approach, we must rely on iteratively refining the value of 
A until the optimal value is reached. The resulted total cache space is used 
as an indicator for optimality. The minimal cost is achieved when Si 
is equal to q. In order to use the distributive algorithm, we assume the 
proxies are cooperative, and they do follow the cost minimization protocol 
to determine the amount of cache contributed to the system. The protocol 
runs collaboratively with assistance from a proxy coordinator. 
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Figure 4.5: Mechanism of the cost minimization protocol. 
The coordinator first make an initial guess of the shadow price A, and 
notifies the proxies. Each proxy reacts to the shadow price with a Si ob-
tained by Equation (4.55), which is privately known to the proxy. Then, 
the coordinator updates the shadow price based on the total cache space 
contributed to the system. If the total cache space is more than required, 
i.e. E仏 1 Si > q, the shadow price is set too high, and it should be reduced. 
If the cache supply is insufficient, the shadow price should be increased. The 
process continues until the optimal value is achieved, where the total cache 
supplied matches the requirement, i.e. YliLi Si = q. 
The most crucial part remained is how to update the shadow price ac-
cording to the cache supplied. The updating rule should be selected carefully 
as it determines the effectiveness of the protocol. Since the problem is proven 
to exist only one minimum, even the simplest numerical search method guar-
antees optimal solution. Other advanced search method, of course, can be 
used to obtain the same result. 
Fig. 4.5 shows the mechanism of the cost minimization protocol. We 
adopt to a simple updating rule, which increase/decrease the value of A in 
proportional to the difference between the desirable cache space q and the 
total contributed cache from the proxies. The updating rule of 入 is 
A ^ A + (4.58) 
The learning rate, 77，is a factor that controls the converging speed and 
the accuracy of the protocol. A large value of rj is used initially to speed up 
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the convergence, and it starts to decrease gradually in order to obtain an 
accurate solution. The protocol is executed periodically to ensure that the 
cost remains minimal after any join or leave of the proxies. In steady state, 
the A leads to a cache allocation with minimal cost. 
The solution of this simplified MinCost problem can be extended to the 
original problem with the cache constraints. The participating proxies react 
to the shadow price similarly as in the simplified MinCost problem. The only 
difference is that the proxy coordinator has an additional task to determine 
whether the cache constraints of the proxies are violated. 
Consider the Equation (4.47) in the KKT-condition, either equals zero 
or Si equals zero. Similarly in Equation (4.48), either fi^ equals zero or Si 
equals Si. To solve the set of linear equations, we have to examine whether 
and /if are equal to zero. Assume both fJ- and fif are zero, the formulation 
of the original problem reduces to the simplified version. We apply the cost 
minimization protocol to obtain the best cache allocation for a total of q 
units of cache space. However, the resulted Si may not satisfy the boundary 
constraints specified in Equation (4.49). In that case, depending on the 
value of Si, one of the fi[ and /i" is not zero. If Si is less than or equal to zero 
for certain proxy z, we are sure that this Si has optimal value of zero, and 
the corresponding is not zero. The proxy is not eligible for contributing 
as the cost of supplying the cache is comparatively high. Similarly, if Si is 
greater than Si, we are sure that the Si of the proxy has optimal value of 
Si. This proxy should provide as much cache as possible since the cost is 
comparatively low. Thus, we can eliminate some proxies, whose value of 
Si is known already, from the problem formulation and resolve the Si for 
the remaining proxies. Note that the total required cache space q of the 
A, 
eliminated problem should be updated accordingly, by subtracting the Si of 
the oversupplied proxies. The algorithm for the cost minimization protocol 
used by the coordinator is shown in Fig. 4.6. 
CHAPTER 4. REVENUE-REWARDING MECHANISM 70 
Cost Minimization: 
1： declare P = { 1, 2, ... , H}\ // indexes of proxy that it's Si 
has not been determined yet 
2: declare pi = {}; / / indexes of proxy that it's Si is zero 
3: declare P" = {}; / / indexes of proxy that it's Si is Si 
4: while (true) do 
5: the new cache requirement q' = q — J^ieP^" 
6: solve the Simplified MinCost Problem distributively with 
the cache requirement of q' among proxy i e P and get 
the optimal Si for proxy i e P] 
7: if Vi G P, 0 < Si < Si then 
8: break; / / end the while loop 
9: end if 
10: declare pt = {}; / / a temporary set 
11: for each i e P 
12: if Si < 0 then 
13: pt = ptD {i}； 
14: end if 
15: end for 
16: if 0 then 
17: p / ^ p i ^ p t . 
18: P = P - pt� 
19: continue; / / next iteration of the while loop 
20: end if 
21: for each i € P 
22: if Si > Si then 
23: = 
24: P= P-{i}; 
25: end if 
26: end for 
27: end while 
Figure 4.6: Cost Maximization Protocol for the proxy coordinator. 
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By the cost minimization protocol with a given fixed total cache quantity, 
the proxies can cooperatively allocate the best amount of cache space to 
achieve minimal cost. 
Optimal Cache Quantity Problem 
The next problem is to determine the optimal amount of cache quantity. The 
optimal cache quantity problem refers to the problem of finding the total 
quantity that results in maximum social utility. Let M(q) be the minimum 
cost of providing q units of total cache. For each q, the value of M(q) can 
be evaluated by solving the corresponding MinCost problem, using the cost 
minimization protocol. The OptQ problem can be formulated as 
OptQ: max [q . P{q) - M{q)] (4.59) 
0<g<g 
H 
where Q = ^ Si. 
i=l 
Obviously, the objective function depends on the variable q only, where 
P{q) is a decreasing function of q and M{q) is an increasing function of q 
(see Fig. 4.7), In fact, the objective function may contain multiple maxima, 
depending on the cost functions and revenue function used in the system. 
Fig. 4.8 plots the revenue, minimum cost and social utility with respect to 
cache quantity in the COPACC system. In this example, the social utility 
is calculated using the total-rewarded price, and the maximum is achieved 
when the cache quantity is around 75. 
Since we do not have the close form solution for the MinCost problem, 
we cannot rely on any optimization method that involves derivative of the 
objective function. In order to find the optimal cache quantity, we suggest 
to use direct search method, which is similar to the one used in the profit 
maximizing game. Pattern search with multiple initial guesses is a good 
approach to the optimal cache quantity problem. 
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Figure 4.8: A sample plot of social utility versus cache quantity q. 
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In the pattern search method, an initial step size s is chosen and the 
search is initiated from a starting point q. The method involves the steps of 
exploration and pattern search. In the exploration step, it tries to probe the 
value of the social utility by increasing or decreasing the cache quantity. Let 
q' = q, the objective function is evaluated at q' + s. If the value increases, 
then q' is updated to q' + s. Otherwise, the function is evaluated at q' — s. 
If the value increases, q' is updated to q' — s. In case both of them fail in 
the test, the original value of q' is retained. An exploration is said to be 
successful if the function valued at q' is higher than g by a predetermined 
amount. The pattern search algorithm starts from a quantity q. The explo-
ration step is made in q. If the exploration fail, the step size is reduced by 
a factor of r, i.e. s rs. Otherwise, a new base point of q is established 
according to the exploration. The search continues until the cache quantity 
q converged. The solution obtained may not be global maximum. To ensure 
that the solution does not trap in the local maxima at steady state, the 
proxy coordinator should periodically probe the system with different cache 
quantity to see if it is still optimal. A random value with large difference 
from the solution is chosen for the probe. 
The solution of the optimal cache quantity problem is indeed the optimal 
quantity for the original utility maximizing problem. It guarantees maximal 
social utility in the network. Moreover, the optimal cache space supplied by-
each individual proxy is determined through the cost minimization protocol, 
and the price is set according to the price function. 
In this subsection, we have presented the utility maximizing game, which 
aims at maximizing the social welfare of the proxies in the network. The 
performance of the three resource allocation games are being evaluated in 
the next section. 
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4.3 Performance Evaluation 
The main focus of this section is to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
revenue-rewarding scheme in encouraging the participation of the NSP and 
the proxies. We show that the scheme can provide a strong incentive for 
different entities to join the system. We have examined the use of revenue-
rewarding in the three resource allocation games, i.e. non-cooperative game 
{NonCoop), profit maximizing game (ProfitMax), and utility maximizing 
game (UtilMax). We have studied the net profit of the NSP as well as 
the social utility of the proxies in the games. We have also compared the 
individual utility of the proxies in each game. The results demonstrate that 
under different resource allocation games, different level of incentive are 
given to different entities in the network. Moreover, an economical cache 
supply is achieved in the ProfitMax and the UtilMax, where the "good" 
peers, which have cheaper cost in providing cache, are retained to participate 
in the system. 
Unless otherwise specified, the following default settings were used in 
the evaluation. We considered a proxy caching network consisting of five 
proxies, which operated under the same NSP. The revenue function was 
approximated by the experimental results from the cost reduction in the 
COPACC system. Each proxy was assigned with an exponential cost func-
tion. The parameters used for the cost and revenue functions are shown in 
Table 4.2，and the corresponding functions are plotted in Fig. 4.9. Note that 
proxy 1,2 and 3 have similar cost function with different level of expensive-
ness. Proxy 4 supplies cache with low initial cost but high variable cost. In 
contrast, proxy 5 has high fixed cost but low variable cost. For simplicity, 
each proxy has the same storage capacity. Lastly, the marginal-rewarded 
pricing was applied in the non-cooperative game and the utility maximizing 
game. 
The evaluation of different rewarding schemes were done based on math-
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Figure 4.9: Cost and revenue functions being used in the evaluation. 
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Proxy i Ai 6i bi Si Cost 
1 10 0.06 0 50 Normal 
2 10 0.06 15 50 Low 
3 15 0.08 0 50 High 
4 8 0.12 10 50 Low for small quantity, high for large quantity 
5 10 0.04 0 50 High for small quantity, low for large quantity 
A' 6' h' 
15 0.03 0 
Table 4.2: Parameters used in the resource allocation game. 
ematical simulation, which was implemented in MATLAB 7.0. The built-in 
Pattern Search Tool, provided in the Genetic Algorithm and Direct Search 
Toolbox of MATLAB, was used to solve the search problem. 
4.3.1 Convergence 
The first issue we are looking at is the convergence. It is a basic requirement 
that the resource allocated by the proxies should converge in each game. We 
analyze the behavior of each game based on the cache contributed at the 
steady state. Fig. 4.10 depicts the quantity of cache supplied by the five 
proxies in each iteration. It demonstrates that all three resource allocation 
games converge to a steady state after a number of iterations. It is observed 
that the NonCoop converges fast, while it takes more iterations for the Prof-
itMax and the UtilMax to stabilize. For the ProfitMax and the UtilMax, the 
speed of convergence is depended on the direct search method implemented. 
In the pattern search method, a large step size is used initially, therefore, 
the cache quantity varies dramatically at the beginning. As the step size de-
creases gradually, the cache quantity stabilizes and converges to the optimal 
value. Fortunately, the converging speed does not affect the performance of 
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the game. As long as the search method converges to an optimal value, the 
corresponding objective function is optimized, and the goal is achieved. 
4.3.2 Participation Incentive 
The primary design objective of this work is to present an incentive mech-
anism to encourage participation of the entities in the network. The eval-
uation results show that this incentive mechanism applied in the COPACC 
system provides a strong incentive for both the NSP and the proxies. In ad-
dition, the incentive for the NSP is different from that of the proxies. The 
NSP is motivated by the attractive net profit to setup the COPACC system 
in its network, while the proxies are encouraged by the positive net utility 
to supply cache to the system. Hence, in this subsection, we evaluate the 
two incentives in the three resource allocation games. 
Net Profit 
Fig. 4.11 plots the net profit of the NSP in the three resource allocation 
games. As we expected, the profit maximizing game generated the highest 
net profit among the three games. The net profit of the ProfitMax was 
352.8, which was 21% higher than that of the NonCoop, and it was 2.26 
times of the net profit in the UtilMax. The UtilMax performed the worse 
because it tried to maximize the benefit in other dimension, social utility, 
by trading off the net profit. 
We also evaluated the performance of the three games under systems 
having different revenue function. All the revenue functions had the same 
ratio of A'/6\ but the value of 9' varied from 0.01 to 0.08. Remember that 
the larger the 6', the higher the revenue is for the same quantity of cache. 
The net profit of the NSP in the systems with different revenue function 
is plotted in Fig. 4.12. The result further illustrates that the ProfitMax 
achieves the highest net profit among the three games. 
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Figure 4.10: Quantity of cache supplied by each proxy. 
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Figure 4.11: Net profit in each resource allocation game. 
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Figure 4.12: Net profit of the NSP in the system with 0' varied from 0.01 
to 0.08. 
CHAPTER 4. REVENUE-REWARDING MECHANISM 80 
Note that the revenue earned by the NSP in each game was different, 
depending on the cache quantity supplied to the system. The revenue, in 
terms of cost reduction, obtained in the COPACC system under the Prof-
itMax was 426.7. It is attractive to the NSP that by rewarding 17% (i.e. 
73.60) of the total revenue to the proxies, which were willing to participate 
due to positive net utility, the NSP can enjoy 83% of the revenue as its 
net profit. Hence, we conclude that the profit maximizing game provides 
a strong incentive for the NSP to setup the revenue-rewarding scheme in 
the COPACC system. We argue that even for the UtilMax, the NSP still 
has incentive to deploy the incentive mechanism as it can retain 37% (i.e. 
108.28) of the revenue as its profit. 
Social Utility 
In this subsection, we evaluate the social utility in different games. Fig. 
4.13 demonstrates the individual utility of the proxies under different games. 
Only the proxies having positive net utility supplied cache to the system. It 
illustrates that the positive net utility provides an initiative incentive to the 
rational proxies to cooperate. 
Fig. 4.14 shows the social utility of all proxies in the three games. The 
social utility achieved by the UtilMax was the highest among the three. In 
this example, the social utility of the UtilMax was 161.7, which was much 
higher than that of the ProfitMax (16.1) and the NonCoop (69.9). In Fig. 
4.15’ the social utility of different games were examined under the systems 
with different revenue function. The result also agrees that the UtilMax 
outperforms other games in utility maximization. 
Since the ProfitMax is designed to maximize the net profit by trading off 
the social utility, the utility achieved in the ProfitMax is the lowest. Note 
that the social utility of the ProfitMax and the NonCoop decreased with an 
increase of 9'. It shows that more utility is traded for the net profit when 
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Figure 4.13: Net utility of each proxy. 
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the is large. 
We are also interested in the total reward received by the proxies and 
the cost in providing the cache. As the UtilMax performs better in utility 
maximizing, we focus this specific game. The total reward granted to the 
proxies was 182.1，and among those, 20.4 (around 11% of the reward) was 
used to maintain the cache. The remaining of the reward (about 89% of 
the total) was owned by the proxies. When we consider the return on in-
vestment, which is defined as the ratio between the utility and the cost, i.e. 
7.9, it can definitely encourage the proxies to participate. In contrast, the 
return on investment of the ProfitMax was 0.28. Thus, under the UtilMax, 
the proxies have a strong incentive to contribute cache in the system. 
Discussion 
In fact, the ProfitMax and the UtilMax have different design objective: the 
former one optimizes the net profit, while the later one optimizes the social 
utility. The key discussion here is which approach, the ProfitMax or the 
UtilMax, is better. There is no strict answer to this question. It depends 
on the objective of implementing the incentive mechanism, and whether to 
benefit the NSP or the proxies. There is a trade-off between the net profit 
and the social utility. 
Indeed, one can compare the performance of the ProfitMax and the 
UtilMax by looking at the sum of the social utility and the net profit as 
shown in Fig. 4.16. It can be seen that the UtilMax is not performing 
well as compared to the ProfitMax and the NonCoop. The reason is that 
under marginal-rewarded pricing, the price of resource drops quickly as the 
quantity increases. As a consequence, the UtilMax tries to keep a high 
price by avoiding large quantity of cache supplied to the system. Thus, only 
a small revenue is obtained, and the achievable sum of the social utility 
and the net profit becomes less. We also examined the UtilMax using the 
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Figure 4.16: Sum of the social utility and the net profit in each resource 
allocation game with & varied from 0.01 to 0.08. 
total-rewarded pricing, in which the net profit of the NSP is always zero. 
The UtilMax(Total) showed in Fig. 4.16 demonstrates that by using total-
rewarded pricing, it achieves the best performance. In fact, we can show that 
the social utility obtained in UtilMax(Total) is equivalent to the maximal 
achievable sum of the social utility and the net profit. Consider the objective 
function of maximizing the sum of the social utility and the net profit, that 
is 
• H 1 r H 
max E � + y^Ui(Si) = max R{q)-Y'Ciisi) . (4.60) 
0<Si<Si [ ^ J 0<Si<Si [ ^ 
Since P{q) = R{q)/q in the total-rewarded pricing, the optimization 
objective of the UtilMax(Total) is equivalent to the above objective. Hence, 
it is the maximal achievable social utility. 
In general, the ProfitMax is suitable for the system that contains a 
centralized authority, like the NSP, and the UtilMax is good for a non-
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Cache supplied (Cost per unit cache) 
NonCoop ProfitMax UtilMax 
Proxy 1 13 (1.68) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
Proxy 2 21 (0.68) 26 (0.74) 20 (0.67) 
Proxy 3 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
Proxy 4 13 (0.88) 12 (0.85) 9 (0.79) 
Proxy 5 20 (1.11) 25 (1.09) 0 (-) 
Overall system 67 (1.04) 63 (0.9) 29 (0.71) 
Table 4.3: Cost per unit cache supplied by the proxies in different game. 
coordinated P2P-like application. By applying the revenue-rewarding scheme, 
the network entities are stimulated to participate in the system. 
4.3.3 Cost effectiveness 
It can be seen in Fig. 4.10 that not all the proxies playing in the resource 
allocation game participate in the system at the steady state. In fact, all . 
the proxies in the network used the same strategy to decide the amount of 
cache to contribute, excepted that they had heterogenous cost function. In 
this subsection, we study how the cost function influences the behavior of 
the proxies. We show that only the cost-effective proxies contribute cache 
to the system. 
Table 4.3 lists the quantity of cache supplied in each game. The quantity 
of cache admitted in each game was different. The NonCoop admitted the 
largest amount of cache, while the UtilMax admitted the smallest. It is due 
to the underlying game rule, which induces the "best" quantity (or price) of 
cache for the system. Clearly, the overall cost for a unit cache in the UtilMax 
should be the lowest because it equips with a cost minimization protocol 
to achieve the lowest cost. In addition, the UtilMax tends to employ few 
proxies, which have low cost among the proxies, to participate. Hence, we 
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conclude that the UtilMax provides a cost-effective resource supply to the 
system. 
We further investigate the cost of maintaining the cache for each in-
dividual proxy, which is listed in Table 4.3. Actually, the three resource 
allocation games implicitly choose the best proxies to cooperate. We ob-
served that Proxy 3 was rejected in all the games because its cost was the 
most expensive. Proxy 2 had a low cost function, thus, it contributed cache 
in all the games. Proxy 4 only contributed small amount of cache as the 
cost for large quantity was high. In contrast, Proxy 5 supplied large quantity 
due to the lowest cost. These results illustrated a desirable property of the 
system: the game automatically admits the best set of proxy to contribute, 
depending on the heterogenous cost function adopted by the proxies. 
In summary, the evaluation results demonstrated that the proposed 
revenue-rewarding scheme applied in incentive-based COPACC system pro-
vides a strong incentive for both the NSP and the proxies to participate in 
the system, and the gaming approach yields a cost-effective resource alloca-
tion from the proxies. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have introduced a cooperative and incentive-based proxy-
and-client caching system for on-demand media streaming. Two major 
components: Cooperative proxy-and-client caching and Revenue-rewarding 
mechanism, have been discussed. 
Ill summary, COPACC is a novel cooperative proxy-and-client caching 
system that combines the best features of proxy caching and peer-to-peer 
communications. It leverages the client-side caching to amplify the aggre-
gated cache space and relies on dedicated proxies to effectively coordinate 
the communications. We have developed an efficient cache allocation al-
gorithm for distributing video segments among the proxies and clients. A 
comprehensive suite of protocols are presented to facilitate the interactions 
among different network entities. It also enables smart and cost-effective 
cache indexing, searching, verifying operations in this hybrid caching sys-
tem. However, COPACC does not address the incentive issue. That is, 
what motivates each proxy to provide cache space and how much cache 
space should be allocated. We have extended COPACC by suggesting a 
revenue-rewarding scheme to encourage proxy cooperation. In this scheme, 
credits are granted to the proxies for their contribution. Game theoretic 
model is used to analyze the interactions between proxies under different 
87 
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resource allocation games. It is shown that no system-wide property is 
achieved in a non-cooperative environment. We have further proposed two 
cooperative resource allocation games that lead to two different optimal 
situations: Maximized net profit and Maximized social welfare. Both cen-
tralized and distributed algorithms are presented for the games to achieve 
different optimal situation. 
We have evaluated the performance of the cooperative and incentive-
based proxy-and-client caching system under various network and end-system 
configurations. Our key findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. With an amplified total cache spaces, cooperative proxy-and-client 
caching significantly reduces the transmission cost for on-demand me-
dia streaming. 
2. With the assistance from dedicated proxies, it is much more robust 
than a pure peer-to-peer system, even though the proxies may con-
tribute only a small fraction of the total cache space. 
3. COPACC scales well in larger network, and the cost generally reduces 
when more proxies and clients cooperate with each other. 
4. The monetary incentive scheme, revenue-rewarding, strongly moti-
vates the network entities to cooperate in the system. 
5. The non-cooperative environment is undesirable, while the two coop-
erative games can achieve different system-wide objectives: Net profit 
and Social utility. 
6. The two cooperative games yield a cost-effective resource allocation 
from the proxies. 
In the future, we can perform more experiments to compare the perfor-
mance of COPACC to other P2P streaming systems, such as CoolStreaming 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 89 
54] and Loopback [34]. The reliability of COPACC can also be enhanced 
by considering replication of cache among proxies. Note the incentive mech-
anism is only applied to the proxies in the system, we can further extend 
the mechanism to encourage the clients to participate. 
• End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
NP-Hardness of the CAP 
problem 
In this appendix, we prove the NP-hardness of the general optimal cache 
allocation problem (CAP). We show this by transforming the optimal re-
source allocation problem (RAP) to CAP in polynomial time. It is known 
that RAP is NP-hard and its decision version is NP-complete [31]. 
In RAP, there are M kinds of resources to be allocated to N activities, 
indexed from 1 through N, and the total available quantity of resource 
[1... M]) is Nj. The objective is to minimize the cost in allocating the 
resources to activities, which can be formulated as: 
^•^•JLiLiXij < NjJ = l ’ 2 ’ . " ’ m ’ 
Xij e 
where Xij is the quantity of resource j allocated to activity i, dij is the 
effectiveness for each unit of resource j allocated to activity i�and fi{) is a 
convex and non-increasing cost function for activity i with given allocations. 
Note that the resources and activities in RAP are analogous to the cache 
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spaces and videos in CAP, respectively. Given an instance of RAP, we can 
create a CAP problem with the following settings: Sj = Nj 二 0, and 
V) 二 ccij, i e [l...N]J e [1 … G [l...Kj]. Since C7ost({p�}’ {g)’jJ) can 
be arbitrary function, we set it as We further set V^ to 
E容liV力 such that the constraint Z f = i P � + < in CAP 
is always satisfied. Given this transformation, it is obvious that an optimal 
solution to CAP, p), leads to an optimal solution to RAP: Xij = p^i e 
[l...iV], j G [1..H]. Since transformation is in polynomial time, it follows 
that problem CAP is NP-hard. 
• 
Appendix B 
Optimality of the Greedy 
Algorithm 
In this appendix, we prove the optimality of the proposed greedy algorithm 
for PA with f i = f i = … = f \ j . 
We define the matrix of the unit transmission costs after exe-
cuting step 1 through 2 as: 
( W P { 1 , 2 ) WP(l,H)� 
iyP(2,l) ^^(2,2) WP{2,H) 
• • . . • 
！ ！ ‘  
； ‘： wp{ij) •: 
• • . • 
« • • • 
^ WP{N, 1) WP{N,2) WP(N,H) ^ 
where WP{iJ) = + 切 S i n c e f j = f], for all j + /’ 
we can drop subscript j of fj and simplify the calculation of as 
p . + w�广P Xj'. We have the following two observations on 
wp{ijy. 
Observation 1. Given e [1... iV], WP{iJ)/WP{iJ) is a constant 
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for any j 6 [1... iJ]. 
Proof. WP{iJ)/WP{lj) 
=f. EjLi K / + f ] AW/ • EiLi H 7 + ^ r ] V 
=P/f 
= WP(iJ)/WP{lj). 
Observation 2. Given j j 6 [1...丑]’ WP{iJ)/WP{iJ) is a constant 
for any i 6 [1... iV] • 
Proof. WP{iJ)/WP{iJ) 
=f. EjLi +^ ri V / 产 . + ^ r ] V 
=EjU + V/EjLi + 切r1 V 
= WP{iJ)/WP(lj). 
Note that the proxies are sorted in ascending order of cost and 
the videos are sorted in descending order of cost 1) in the greedy 
algorithm, that is, WP{i,j) < WP(iJ') for j < j' and WP(iJ) > WP{i',j) 
for i < i'. We then have another two observations: 
Observation 3. j) - j - j) <Wp{i- I j) -WP(i-1 j - j) 
for z G [1... (i - 1)] and j e [I . . . ( j - 1)]. 
Proof. From observation 1’ we have WP{iJ)/WP{i-iJ) = WP{iJ-j)/WP{i-
2, j — j) = a, where a is a constant. This is equivalent to WP{i,j)= 
a . WP{i - ij) and WP{i,j - 3) = a • WP{i - I j 一 j). Here, 0 < a < 1 
because W^iiJ) < WP{i - i j ) for z > 0. It follows that 
二 a . WP(i - l j ) - a - WP{i - i j - j) 
Observation 4. WP{iJ+j) -WP{iJ) > + 
for i e [I... {N-i)] and J e [I... {H- j)]. 
Proof. Prom observation 1’ we have WP{i + iJ)/WP{iJ) = + i, j + 
j)/WP{i, j + j ) = b, where 6 is a constant. This is equivalent to WP(i+i, j)= 
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b • WP{iJ) and WP(i -\-iJ+j) = b- WP{i,j + j). Here, 0 < 6 < 1 because 
WP{i + I j ) < WP{iJ) for z > 0. It follows that 
WPiiJ+j)-WP{iJ) 
The above two observations imply that swapping one unit data of video 
i in proxy j with that of video i' {i' E [1... (i - 1)]) in proxy j' ( / e 
[1... ( j 一 1)]) yields the same or higher total cost, and, similarly, swapping 
one unit data of video i in proxy j with that of video i丨{i' € [(i + 1). . . N]) in 
proxy f (f e [{j + 1)...H]) yields the same or higher cost. As the prefixes 
are fully packed to the proxies and there is no space left, the solution given 
by the greedy algorithm is optimal. 
• 
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